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The Natures of Universal Moralities 
Bailey Kuklin† 
One of the abiding lessons from postmodernism is that 
reason does not go all the way down.1 In the context of this 
symposium, one cannot deductively derive a universal morality 
from incontestible moral primitives,2 or practical reason alone.3 
Instead, even reasoned moral systems must ultimately be 
grounded on intuition,4 a sense of justice. The question then 
  
 † Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. I wish to thank the presenters and 
participants of the Brooklyn Law School Symposium entitled “Is Morality Universal, 
and Should the Law Care?” and those at the Tenth SEAL Scholarship Conference. 
Further thanks go to Brooklyn Law School for supporting this project with a summer 
research stipend. 
 1 “Simplifying to the extreme, I define postmodern as incredulity toward 
metanarratives.” JEAN-FRANCOIS LYOTARD, THE POSTMODERN CONDITION: A REPORT 
ON KNOWLEDGE xxiv (Geoff Bennington & Brian Massumi trans., 1984). “If modernity 
is viewed with Weberian optimism as the project of rationalisation of the life-world, an 
era of material progress, social emancipation and scientific innovation, the postmodern 
is derided as chaotic, catastrophic, nihilistic, the end of good order.” COSTAS DOUZINAS 
ET AL., POSTMODERN JURISPRUDENCE 16 (1991). “In short, we have reached a point 
where theory has effectively turned against itself, generating a form of extreme 
epistemological scepticism which reduces everything—philosophy, politics, criticism 
and ‘theory’ alike—to a dead level of suasive or rhetorical effect where consensus-
values are the last (indeed the only) court of appeal.” CHRISTOPHER NORRIS, WHAT’S 
WRONG WITH POSTMODERNISM? 4 (1990). See Scott Fruehwald, The Emperor Has No 
Clothes: Postmodern Legal Thought and Cognitive Science, 23 GA. ST. L. REV. 375, 377-
79 (2006).  
 2 “[M]oral primitive concepts . . . are epistemically basic and transparent.” 
Benjamin C. Zipursky, Rawls in Tort Theory: Themes and Counter-themes, 72 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1923, 1927 (2004). See JEFFRIE G. MURPHY, Three Mistakes About 
Retributivism, in RETRIBUTION, JUSTICE, AND THERAPY 77, 77 (1979) (“[T]he claim is a 
primitive and unanalysed proposition which is [said to be] morally ultimate,” such as 
“‘happiness is good’, ‘freedom is to be respected.’”).  
 3 The most famous attempt at deriving morality from practical reason is by 
Kant. See IMMANUEL KANT, PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY (Mary J. Gregor, trans. & ed. 
1996). That “‘evolutionary ethics’, that is, an ethical theory which incorporates to 
various degrees the evolutionary history of our specifically moral traits and behaviors” 
may lead to “a recognizably Kantian cognitivist evolutionary metaethics,” see Frederick 
Rauscher, How a Kantian Can Accept Evolutionary Metaethics, 12 BIOLOGY & PHIL. 
303, 303 (1997).  
 4 “We could never get started on everyday moral reasoning about any moral 
problem without relying on moral intuitions.” Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Framing 
Moral Intuitions, in 2 MORAL PSYCHOLOGY 47, 47 (Walter Sinnott-Armstrong ed., 
2008). Haidt has been a leader in developing this idea. He asserts: “(1) Moral beliefs 
and motivations come from a small set of intuitions that evolution has prepared the 
human mind to develop . . . and (2) moral judgment is a product of quick and automatic 
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arises, whence come moral intuitions?5 Evolutionary biology 
offers answers.6 In this article, I examine the main ones 
advanced by evolutionary theory. Since the products of 
evolutionary principles are contingent on chance and the 
environment in which the evolution occurs, I speculate on the 
range of moral intuitions consistent with these principles. To 
give the punch line first, the possible range is broad, and the 
actual range is an empirical question that is very difficult to 
tease out. Nevertheless, the law is deeply concerned with the 
range because moral intuitions often facilitate, and sometimes 
frustrate, social and legal goals. But first, let us begin with the 
basic principles of evolution. 
In what follows, I first introduce the evolutionary 
theories advanced as grounding moral dispositions: kin 
selection, reciprocal altruism, and sexual selection. Let me 
emphasize that this is a survey only, for there is a vast body of 
literature on the reach and complexities of these theories. But 
an introduction is enough to get to the next step. Then, 
assuming that human cognition is fully up to the task and that 
chance and circumstances were accommodating, I identify the 
range of likely emotions and moral impulses stemming from 
these theories. Finally, I relax these assumptions and speculate 
on how this may affect evolved moral impulses. 
  
intuitions that then give rise to slow, conscious moral reasoning.” Jonathan Haidt & 
Fredrik Bjorklund, Social Intuitionists Answer Six Questions About Moral Psychology, 
in 2 MORAL PSYCHOLOGY 181, 181 (Walter Sinnott-Armstrong ed., 2008). “Most likely, 
moral emotions help guide moral judgments by attaching value to whichever 
behavioral options are contemplated during the tackling of a moral dilemma.” Jorge 
Moll et al., The Cognitive Neuroscience of Moral Emotions, in 3 MORAL PSYCHOLOGY 1, 
5 (Walter Sinnott-Armstrong ed., 2008).  
 5 Hauser argues that, if there are moral universals, there are at least three 
possibilities: first, “a nativist position that puts precise moral rules or norms in the 
newborn’s head;” second, “the view that we are born with abstract rules or principles, 
with nurture entering the picture to set the parameters and guide us toward the 
acquisition of particular moral systems;” and third, “the view that our moral faculty 
lacks content but starts us off with a device that can acquire moral norms.” MARC D. 
HAUSER, MORAL MINDS 165 (2006). He prefers the middle view. Id. 
 6 “Moral philosophers from Plato . . . on down have relied on their intuitive 
sense of right and wrong to guide them on their attempts to make sense of morality. 
The relevance of science then is that it can tell us how our moral intuitions work and 
where they come from.” Joshua D. Greene, The Secret Joke of Kant’s Soul, in 3 MORAL 
PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 4, at 35, 67. For an intriguing discussion of human’s evolved 
capacities to employ moral and legal reasoning, see Robin Bradley Kar, The Deep 
Structure of Law and Morality, 84 TEX. L. REV. 877 (2006). 
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I. NATURAL SELECTION 
While few, if any, reputable biologists currently deny 
that all life forms are subject to Darwinian natural selection, 
the extent to which human behavior conforms to this principle 
has been more controversial. In recent decades, several 
disciplines have been founded or informed by the proposition 
that human behavior and emotions, like human physical and 
cognitive traits, are subject to the filter of fitness. Among these 
disciplines are evolutionary psychology, Darwinian 
anthropology, behavioral biology, human ethology, and 
behavioral ecology.7  
The basic tenets of Darwinian evolution are rather 
simple and straightforward. Because more organisms are 
produced than can be supported by available resources, not all 
of them will prosper and reproduce. Those with heritable traits 
that provide advantages in the struggle to survive and 
reproduce are more likely to expand the number of their genes 
in the gene pool. The basic requisites for natural selection, 
then, are three: variation, differential fitness, and heritability.8 
Some characteristics within a species must vary; these 
qualities must differ in their ability to facilitate reproduction; 
and, these qualities must be passed on to descendants.9 Under 
the metaphor of the “selfish” gene,10 a particular gene, or form 
of it (allele), is more likely to expand its number in the gene 
  
 7 See, e.g., JOHN CARTWRIGHT, EVOLUTION AND HUMAN BEHAVIOR 48-50 
(2000); EDWARD O. WILSON, CONSILIENCE 168 (1998); N.A. Chagnon & W. Irons, 
Preface, in EVOLUTIONARY BIOLOGY AND HUMAN SOCIAL BEHAVIOR xi, xii (Napoleon A. 
Chagnon & William Irons eds., 1979); Owen D. Jones, Law and Evolutionary Biology: 
Obstacles and Opportunities, 10 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 265, 270-71 n.13 
(1994); Mary Maxwell, Introduction, in THE SOCIOBIOLOGICAL IMAGINATION 1, 22 
(Mary Maxwell ed., 1991); Donald Symons, On the Use and Misuse of Darwinism in the 
Study of Human Behavior, in THE ADAPTED MIND 137, 146 (Jerome H. Barkow et al. 
eds., 1992). See generally ULLICA SEGERSTRÅLE, DEFENDERS OF THE TRUTH: THE 
BATTLE FOR SCIENCE IN THE SOCIOBIOLOGY DEBATE AND BEYOND 316-20 (2000). For 
simplicity, I will refer to these fields of study generally as evolutionary psychology. 
 8 See, e.g., DAVID M. BUSS, EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY 7 (1999); STEPHEN 
JAY GOULD, Prologue, in BULLY FOR BRONTOSAURUS 11, 11-13 (1991); Richard C. 
Lewontin, Adaptation, SCI. AM. 213, 220 (Sept. 1978). 
 9 See, e.g., STEPHEN JAY GOULD, Prologue, in BULLY FOR BRONTOSAURUS 11, 
11-13 (1991); JOHN MAYNARD SMITH & EORS SZATHMARY, THE ORIGINS OF LIFE 1-3 
(1999); Richard C. Lewontin, Adaptation, SCI. AM. 213, 220 (Sept. 1978). See generally 
ERNST MAYR, WHAT EVOLUTION IS (2001).  
 10 See RICHARD DAWKINS, THE SELFISH GENE (new ed. 1989).  
466 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 75:2 
 
pool if it confers characteristics to the organism—by itself or 
with other genes—that further successful reproduction.11 
One of the most difficult issues facing evolutionary 
principles is the question of altruistic behavior. For if the 
evolution of behavior is driven by the metaphorical selfish 
gene, it would seem that any genetic disposition to sacrifice 
one’s own welfare for that of another would be selected out by 
the relentless forces of competition. Yet moral behavior, 
perhaps by definition, requires the willingness to put someone 
else’s interests ahead of one’s own.12 Otherwise, one is simply 
acting prudently, in one’s own self-interest, not morally. 
Evolutionists offer various theories to counter this intuition 
disfavoring altruism. The two most common are kin selection 
and reciprocal altruism. Another one, sexual selection, though 
having garnered less attention than the others, is also worthy 
of consideration, especially since it may offer the prospect of 
the most general form of moral impulses. 
All three theories are subject to the vagaries of chance 
and historical contingency. The trajectory of evolution is far 
from predetermined. Evolution works on the genetic materials 
at hand. If the fortuities of the reproductive and mutational 
processes do not produce a particular beneficial gene at an 
appropriate time and place that succeeds in enriching the gene 
pool, the forces of evolution may move on in a different 
direction altogether, forever foreclosing ultimately fitter 
possibilities. Evolution cannot anticipate future benefits. In 
conjunction with the environment, evolutionary processes slap 
together a phenotype, perhaps jerry-built from the genes 
available, and let the fates decide. Good enough, not perfection, 
  
 11 See, e.g., JOHN C. AVISE, THE GENETIC GODS 107-11 (1998); RICHARD 
DAWKINS, RIVER OUT OF EDEN 5 (1995); BOBBI S. LOW, WHY SEX MATTERS 19-20 (2000).  
 12 See, e.g., Julia Annas, Virtue Ethics and the Charge of Egoism, in 
MORALITY AND SELF-INTEREST 205, 205 (Paul Bloomfield ed., 2008) (referring to “the 
very basic thought that ethics is fundamentally about the good of others, not my good”); 
Richard Joyce, Response to Nichols and Katz, in 3 MORAL PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 4, 
at 419, 425 [hereinafter Joyce, Response] (while recognizing room for some, but not 
entirely, “self-promoting moral values and duties”, asserting that “moral normativity 
centrally involves other persons being loci of value and imposers of duties”); David 
Schmidtz, Because It’s Right, in MORALITY AND SELF-INTEREST, supra, at 79, 81 
(“Moral reasons are categorical, which means they have a claim on us independent of 
how they appeal to our interests and desires.”). For views that morality has room for 
self-interest, see infra note 34 and accompanying text. Haidt, a leading researcher of 
moral psychology, offers this definition of morality: “morality is any system of 
interlocking values, practices, institutions, and psychological mechanisms that work 
together to suppress or regulate selfishness and make social life possible.” Jonathan 
Haidt, What Makes People Vote Republican?, http://www.alternet.org/story/98902/. 
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rules.13 For example, even though it would be beneficial to 
humans to have a dog’s ability to smell or an eagle’s ability to 
see, natural selection will not produce these cognitive abilities 
if chance, circumstances, and tradeoffs are not favorable. 
Moreover, cognitive traits affect further natural selection. In 
the context of moral impulses, we can imagine that behavior 
and moral dispositions would be somewhat different if humans 
had the unerring ability to discern deceit or cooperativeness in 
others. 
The evolutionary role of chance and circumstance 
deserves special emphasis. The fittest genome will leave no 
descendants in the gene pool if it resides in a child who is 
struck down by lightning. Similarly, the greatest potential 
football player will not prosper by virtue of his unique skills in 
a society that does not play the game.14 Even the greatest 
intelligence may be a handicap if it manifests in an outcaste in 
a rigid, intolerant regime.15 As for any emotional or moral 
genetic dispositions, the difference may be substantial 
depending on whether the traits evolved while humans lived in 
small, isolated, closely-related clans, rather than large, 
interrelating, diverse tribes, or whether the resources available 
were abundant and dependable rather than scarce and 
unpredictable.16 Hence, successful predictions of possible moral 
  
 13 Even the human eye, its “perfection” often advanced as evidence of 
creationism or intelligent design, is quite flawed, as I, with my far-sightedness, 
astigmatism, and floaters can affirm, but I nevertheless am better off with my faulty 
vision than without it. See, e.g., RICHARD DAWKINS, CLIMBING MOUNT IMPROBABLE 
138-97 (1996) (discussing the fitness value of a wide-range of visual acuity); RICHARD 
DAWKINS, RIVER OUT OF EDEN 76-78 (1995) (same). In general, selection favors 
improvement irrespective of “perfection”. See, e.g., ERNST MAYR, TOWARD A NEW 
PHILOSOPHY OF BIOLOGY 156 (1988) (“Darwin . . . was aware of the fact that the 
perfecting of adaptations needs to be brought only to the point where an individual is 
‘as perfect as, or slight more perfect than’ any of its competitors”); ERNST MAYR, WHAT 
EVOLUTION IS 281-82 (2001); Robert Kurzban, Biological Foundations of Reciprocity, in 
TRUST AND RECIPROCITY 105, 110-11 (Elinor Ostrom & James Walker eds., 2003) 
(noting that cognitive systems “simply have to have been better than any other 
candidate systems at solving a specific adaptive problem”). 
 14 As one sportswriter said of Joe Namath, “If it weren’t for football, Namath 
wouldn’t have been anything but a local yokel back home in Pennsylvania.” JOE WILLIE 
NAMATH & DICK SCHAAP, I CAN’T WAIT UNTIL TOMORROW 232 (1969). Namath 
demurred: “I’d have joined the Air Force or even, if I’d been real desperate, become a 
sportswriter.” Id. 
 15 Cf. Carl Zimmer, Lots of Animals Learn, but Smarter Isn’t Better, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 6, 2008, at F1 (arguing that intelligence may have harmful side effects and 
undue costs).  
 16 One anthropologist “hypothesizes that humans have adapted to an 
ecological niche involving the hunting and gathering of high-density, protein-rich 
foods,” which “promoted adaptations for food sharing, thus increasing the maximum 
sustainable group size by decreasing the risk of starvation.” Kevin A. McCabe, A 
 
468 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 75:2 
 
dispositions require knowledge of the environment, broadly 
speaking, in which they emerged. This is known as the 
environment of evolutionary adaptedness (EEA).17 
There are other difficulties under evolutionary theory to 
predicting behavioral dispositions from theory alone. First 
among them is the effect of pleiotropy. A gene or set of genes 
may have more than one impact on an organism, both positive 
and negative.18 So long as the positive outweighs the negative, 
the gene(s) would be favored by natural selection, even though 
the effect is counterproductive with regard to a trait under 
consideration.19 A second difficulty is that certain evolutionary 
pathways may be precluded or preferred by developmental, 
structural, or other phenotype characteristics that happen to be 
selected in the past, as where the route to more durable backs 
and knees was greatly complicated by the fact that humans 
evolved from quadrupeds.20 Third, evolutionary forces may 
operate against one another with their relative weights 
depending, again, on chance and circumstances. For example, 
insofar as individual and group selection are at work to 
reinforce dispositions to conform to community norms,21 this 
may come up against other, inconsistent dispositions,22 as 
where a person is inclined to freeride on public goods provided 
by others despite contrary norms.23 In the context here, moral 
tendencies may be outweighed by social norms, as seems to be 
  
Cognitive Theory of Reciprocal Exchange, in TRUST AND RECIPROCITY, supra note 13, at 
147, 156 (references omitted). 
 17 See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER BADCOCK, EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY 12 (2000); 
ROBERT WRIGHT, THE MORAL ANIMAL 37-39 (1994); Charles Crawford, Environments 
and Adaptations: Then and Now, in HANDBOOK OF EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY 275 
(Charles Crawford & Dennis L. Krebs eds., 1998); Symons, supra note 7, at 143-44. 
 18 See, e.g., DAVID M. BUSS, EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY 92-93 (1999); 
HELENA CRONIN, THE ANT AND THE PEACOCK 60 (1991); EDWARD O. WILSON, 
SOCIOBIOLOGY: THE NEW SYNTHESIS 591 (1975).  
 19 The environment may determine whether such a trait is adaptive. “For 
example, the sickle-cell trait of human beings, determined by the heterozygous state of 
a single gene, is adaptive under living conditions in Africa, where it confers some 
degree of resistance to falciparum malaria,” but not in America where “its bearers are 
no longer confronted by malaria.” WILSON, supra note 18, at 21.  
 20 See, e.g., S. Jay Olshansky et al., If Humans Were Built to Last, SCI. AM. 50 
(Mar. 2001).  
 21 There is a disposition to conform to community norms. See, e.g., LEWIS 
PETRINOVICH, HUMAN EVOLUTION, REPRODUCTION, AND MORALITY 72 (1995); WRIGHT, 
supra note 17, at 183-84 (1994); Philip Kitcher, Psychological Altruism, Evolutionary 
Origins, and Moral Rules, 89 PHIL. STUD. 283, 305 (1998). 
 22 See, e.g., DANIEL C. DENNETT, FREEDOM EVOLVES 196-97 (2003).  
 23 See CHARLES J. LUMSDEN & EDWARD O. WILSON, PROMETHEAN FIRE 179 
(1983) (“[M]oral reasoning . . . appears to be ultimately dependent on the genes as well 
as on culture and self-conscious decision.”).  
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the case in the Third Reich and Cambodia during the Pol Pot 
regime. Far short of these extremes, the origins of moral 
dispositions discussed below may point towards inconsistent 
predictions in even ordinary circumstances.  
II. EVOLUTIONARY THEORIES OF MORALITY 
A. Kin Selection 
Kin selection is based on the proposition that one may 
enlarge one’s contribution to the gene pool not only through 
one’s direct descendants, but also through other genetic 
relatives.24 This is because a person shares half her genes with 
her parents, siblings and children, one-quarter of her genes 
with her blood aunts and uncles, nieces and nephews, 
grandparents, and grandchildren, one-eighth of her genes with 
her great-grandchildren and first cousins, and so on. Therefore, 
she would make an equal contribution to the gene pool by 
producing one offspring herself or by helping her siblings 
produce two, her nieces produce four, or her first cousins 
produce eight.25 
But, genetically speaking, not all similarly related kin 
are equal. That is, some kin have better prospects of passing 
along their genes than do others. For example, in a developed, 
democratic society with Western values, if not everywhere, a 
woman is more likely to pass along her genes if she is 
attractive, charming, and nurturing, among other traits.26 A 
man will probably be more successful if he is athletic, 
intelligent, and wealthy. Prospects also turn on where a person 
is in the ontogenetic cycle, as a young adult is likely to be more 
genetically productive in the future than is a person who is “of 
a certain age.” The qualities for genetic success, direct and 
indirect, are many and varied, and largely contingent on the 
physical and social environment. 
  
 24 See generally BADCOCK, supra note 17, at 79-93; BUSS, supra note 18, at 
222-49; CRONIN, supra note 18, at 293-310; W.D. HAMILTON, Hamilton’s Rule, in 1 
NARROW ROADS OF GENE LAND 11 (1996); ROBERT TRIVERS, SOCIAL EVOLUTION 45-47, 
169-202 (1985) [hereinafter TRIVERS, SOCIAL EVOLUTION].  
 25 See LEE DUGATKIN, CHEATING MONKEYS AND CITIZEN BEES 43-44 (1999) 
(“Hamilton’s Rule”); JOHN MAYNARD SMITH, DID DARWIN GET IT RIGHT? 187 (1989); 
John Maynard Smith, The Evolution of Animal Intelligence, in MINDS, MACHINES AND 
EVOLUTION 63, 64 (Christopher Hookway ed., 1984). 
 26 The traits that attract desired matings are examined in greater detail in 
the section on sexual selection. See infra Part IV. 
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Let us assume that humans have the ideal cognitive 
abilities for advancing their genetic interests through kin 
selection.27 Most obviously, this would include the capacity to 
identify the exact familial relationship to others, as where the 
sense of smell could pick up precise genetic signals.28 It would 
also include the highly refined ability to calculate, or intuit,29 
genetic payoffs for investing in one’s kin and oneself. For 
example, assume a young person is facing the prospects of 
producing his own children or sacrificing this opportunity in 
order to advance that of a sister. Many types of tradeoffs would 
go into his evolutionary payoff calculus. He would have to 
incorporate, consciously or otherwise, the following kinds of 
likelihoods: that he and his sister would find mates or 
matings;30 the genetic fitness of these matches;31 the number of 
their offspring; the relative future wherewithal of him and his 
sister, and their partners, families and supporters, to raise 
accomplished children; the success of these children to further 
reproduce; etc.32 These estimates turn on many factors, such as 
  
 27 As noted by Hauser, HAUSER, supra note 5, at 251-52, even before 
evolutionary psychology took off with the publication of Edward O. Wilson’s seminal 
tract, SOCIOBIOLOGY: THE NEW SYNTHESIS (1975), Rawls worried that kin selection 
would threaten “the principles of justice” either by limiting the capacity for moral 
behavior to kin or driving out more universal dispositions, JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF 
JUSTICE 503-04 (1971).  
 28 There is evidence that human mothers have the ability to identify their 
newborns by smell, and vice versa. See Natalie Angier, Powerhouse Of Senses, Smell, at 
Last Gets Its Due, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 1995, at C1. Some animals identify kin by odor. 
See MICHAEL S. GAZZANIGA, HUMAN 310 (2008). Even some plants can recognize kin. 
See Carol K. Yoon, Loyal to Its Roots, N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 2008, at F1 (“If the sea 
rocket detects unrelated plants growing in the ground with it, the plant aggressively 
sprouts nutrient-grabbing roots. But if it detects family, it politely restrains itself.”). 
 29 Recall that kin selection applies to all organisms. Therefore, this principle 
can operate at a fully intuitive, or even purely biochemical level, without the need for 
considered calculation, as in the case of plants. 
 30 “Mates” refers to pair-bonded partners, while “matings” refers to 
reproduction with others. 
 31 What is meant by genetic desirability is taken up in the section on sexual 
selection. See infra Part IV. 
 32 In the context of reciprocal altruism, it has been noted that “[s]eparate 
[cognitive] subsystems must exist that are capable of calculating costs and benefits of 
various outcomes and actions for the self; similarly, systems must exist that can 
calculate the costs and benefits of various actions to other individuals as well.” 
Kurzban, supra note 13, at 117. In general, to increase fitness in social environments, 
“cognitive adaptations are hypothesized to exist to reason about others’ behavior,” 
including systems that monitor others’ actions, estimate their effects on inclusive 
fitness, and motivate beneficial responses. Debra Lieberman, Moral Sentiments 
Relating to Incest: Discerning Adaptations from By-Products, in 1 MORAL PSYCHOLOGY 
165, 167 (Walter Sinnott-Armstrong ed., 2008). But, Lieberman cautions, “some moral 
sentiments relating to third-party behavior may be by-products of psychological 
adaptations.” Id. at 169. 
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the youth, attractiveness, accomplishments, vivacity, and 
motherliness of his sister, and his own abilities, commitment, 
personality, and financial expectations. The number of relevant 
factors is daunting, and the contingent ones must be 
discounted by their probability. But in the ideal, kin-selected 
world we temporarily inhabit, this is not a problem. 
Now let us identify the types of normative impulses or 
deductions that would be expected in this ideal, entirely kin-
selected world.33 First, assume that our young person concludes 
that he himself has better prospects than his sister of enriching 
the gene pool. This might be the evolutionary maxim that 
would emerge: “do nothing for your sister that has any cost to 
you.” Or, if he finds that he can induce his sister and others to 
advance his own genetic interests, it might be: “invest in your 
sister to the extent that it induces her and others to invest even 
more in you and your descendants.” This Machiavellian maxim 
would be generalized to include all relatives, and even all other 
persons. It seems psychopathic, immoral, dystopian.34 On the 
other hand, if our young man concludes that his sister has 
more than double the prospects of enriching the gene pool than 
he does, this may be the maxim he embraces: “sacrifice yourself 
for your sister and her descendants to the point where further 
sacrifice does not contribute to their genetic prospects.”35 Or, “to 
the point where further sacrifice would contribute less than 
  
 33 “There is a profound sense in which charity begins at home. . . . Is this then 
a ‘moral’ commitment or not? . . . For apart from not being grounded in regard for 
others, such a commitment may be precisely like the typical moral commitment in its 
cogency, its form and its action-guiding relevance.” W.D. Falk, Morality, Self, and 
Others, in MORALITY AND SELF-INTEREST, supra note 12, at 225, 240. For discussion of 
various “evolutionary behavioral maxims” and the morality behind them, see Bailey 
Kuklin, The Morality of Evolutionarily Self-Interested Rescues, 40 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 453, 
469-73 (2008).  
 34 For a role for self-interest in moral thinking, see, for example, Paul 
Bloomfield, Introduction, in MORALITY AND SELF-INTEREST, supra note 12, at 3. “Once 
we have a proper understanding of morality and of the nature of individual interests, 
we will see that morality and self-interest can never in fact conflict.” Samuel Scheffler, 
Potential Congruence, in MORALITY AND SELF-INTEREST, supra note 12, at 117, 117. 
Rationality may have made the difference. Joyce speculates that “if our ancestors had 
never evolved the sophisticated rational abilities that humans at present enjoy, we 
would never have gotten beyond liking actions that help ourselves and our kin and 
disliking actions that harm them, in which case perhaps we would never have started 
making moral judgments at all.” Richard Joyce, What Neuroscience Can (and Cannot) 
Contribute to Metaethics, in 3 MORAL PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 4, at 371, 390. Yet 
genetically self-interested maxims may find some support in the interstices of standard 
moral theory. See Kuklin, supra note 33, at 454-58. But see Joyce, Response, supra note 
12; Schmidtz, supra note 12. 
 35 This sounds like the stereotypical plaint of mothers everywhere. You may 
insert your own ethnic jokes here. 
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using your resources for offspring of your own or those of 
another relative.” Acting on this maxim may well drive our 
young man down the slope of martyrdom. Instead of being the 
devil above, he has become a saint.36 Well, not quite a perfect 
saint, for he is acting in his own genetic self-interest.37 Of 
course, the world he comprehends so well will be much more 
complicated than these bare examples suggest. These supposed 
calculations have been expressed with an unrealistic certainty. 
For example, his sister may have better prospects than he does, 
but this is likely to be probabilistic only, requiring him to 
calculate the odds of each of the relevant contingencies relating 
to the enrichment of the gene pool with his genes. This would 
require the computation of a very complex portfolio of “genetic 
investments” that include this sister and all his other kin in 
proportion to their relatedness and prospects, and even non-kin 
insofar as they will reciprocate to kin with interest.38 The 
selfish gene, fully refined, requires a supercomputer for 
calculations, to say nothing of an enormous data input.39  
Returning to the real world, we find, first of all, that 
these types of difficult calculations are beyond the abilities of 
humans. In recent decades, behavioral economics and cognitive 
psychology, among other disciplines, have made it clear that 
humans are oftentimes crude reckoners. We are faulty at 
perceiving data, weak at using the data to arrive at logical 
conclusions, and even shaky at appreciating our own 
preferences.40 In the face of risk and uncertainty we may be 
relegated to guesstimates and heuristics.41 Now I do not wish to 
  
 36 That saintliness is something we admire, but are unlikely to seek. See 
MICHAEL RUSE, TAKING DARWIN SERIOUSLY 244 (2d ed. 1998); John L. Mackie, The 
Law of the Jungle: Moral Alternatives and Principles of Evolution, in PHILOSOPHY OF 
BIOLOGY 303, 312 (Michael Ruse ed., 1998).  
 37 The altruism of religious saints driven by rewards promised in the afterlife 
may also be challenged. See JANET R. RICHARDS, HUMAN NATURE AFTER DARWIN 156 
(2000).  
 38 By considering non-kin, the calculation suggests reciprocal altruism, the 
next topic, rather than simply kin selection. 
 39 For a discussion of these kinds of calculations, see JEROME H. BARKOW, 
DARWIN, SEX, AND STATUS 48-53 (1989).  
 40 See generally ADVANCES IN BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS (Colin F. Camerer et 
al. eds., 2003); CHOICES, VALUES, AND FRAMES (Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky 
eds., 2000); HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT 
(Thomas Gilovich et al. eds., 2002); JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND 
BIASES (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982); THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF IRRATIONAL 
BEHAVIOR (Francesco Parisi & Vernon L. Smith eds., 2005). 
 41 See generally GERD GIGERENZER, ADAPTIVE THINKING: RATIONALITY IN THE 
REAL WORLD (2000); GIGERENZER ET AL., SIMPLE HEURISTICS THAT MAKE US SMART 
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unduly downplay our rationality. We have demonstrated 
enough aptitude to get us off the savanna and onto the moon, 
though, perhaps, not enough to keep us prospering much 
longer. But in considering the impulses, moral and otherwise, 
that have been selected over millions of years in furtherance of 
our struggles for survival and reproduction, it is apparent that 
they have had to accommodate our coarse perceptions and 
fallible computations. 
The real world also makes clear that humans are not 
capable of identifying kin with exactitude.42 Instead, biologists 
have found indirect mechanisms for identifying kinship 
relationships, including location, familiarity, phenotype 
matching, and recognition alleles.43 These recognition clues are 
based on the observation that, for humans, especially in 
prehistoric times, two people are more likely to be related to 
one another if they are raised together in the same den or 
household, or even in the same group or vicinity.44 
Furthermore, similar physical characteristics imply a likely 
relationship,45 as do particularly unusual traits shared in 
common.46 
  
(1999); BOUNDED RATIONALITY: THE ADAPTIVE TOOLBOX (Gerd Gigerenzer & Reinhard 
Selten eds., 2002). 
 42 Of course, women can perfectly well identify their children. Hence, 
grandmothers and their female ancestors can be certain that their daughters’ lineal 
descendants are theirs. As far as the men in the house, well, it’s “mother’s baby, 
father’s maybe.” Nicholas Wade, Birds Do It. Bees Do It. Some People Do, Too, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 20, 2001, § 4 (Week in Review), at 5 (“And next time you look over a cradle, 
into those innocent eyes and half-formed smile, remember the old saying, ‘Mother’s 
baby, father’s maybe.’ and resolve to have a serious talk one day with your own mother, 
when you are a little older.”).  
 43 See CARTWRIGHT, supra note 7, at 80-82 (location, familiarity, phenotype 
matching, and recognition alleles and “green beards”); DAWKINS, supra note 10, at 89-
90 (“Green Beard Altruism Effect”); R. PAUL SHAW & YUWA WONG, GENETIC SEEDS OF 
WARFARE 39 (1989) (spatial proximity, early experience, and phenotypic matching); 
Charles Crawford, Psychology, in THE SOCIOBIOLOGICAL IMAGINATION, supra note 7, at 
303, 310-11 (spatial distribution, association, phenotype matching, and recognition 
alleles). 
  “In general, evolution is hypothesized to have taken advantage of 
statistically recurring patterns to fashion kin-detection mechanisms.” Lieberman, 
supra note 32, at 174. 
 44 See, e.g., CARTWRIGHT, supra note 7, at 80 (“location” and “familiarity”).  
 45 See C.R. BADCOCK, THE PROBLEM OF ALTRUISM 75 (1986); CARTWRIGHT, 
supra note 7, at 80-81; HAMILTON, Selection of Selfish and Altruistic Behaviour in 
Some Extreme Models, in 1 NARROW ROADS OF GENE LAND, supra note 24, at 198, 211 . 
 46 Dawkins observed that if a gene or genes that produced a particular effect, 
say, altruism, also produced a recognizable feature (“green beard”), then this common 
feature would identify those who are likely to be related and hence share the altruistic 
gene(s). See DAWKINS, supra note 10, at 89-90. 
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Taking these four kinship identification mechanisms in 
turn, various kin selection maxims may ensue. From location 
and familiarity clues, one would be disposed to act in other 
persons’ reproductive interest (and indirectly, one’s own) to the 
extent they were raised in the same household or vicinity, or 
are known to oneself. Similarly, from phenotype matching and 
recognition allele clues, one would favor others to the extent 
that they looked like oneself or had a particular feature in 
common. A broad range of morally questionable dispositions 
(biases) would align with these kin identification mechanisms, 
including territoriality, ethnocentricity, racism, tribalism, 
nationalism, and xenophobia.47 
But the genetic usefulness of any impulses that arise 
from kin recognition clues depends on the circumstances in 
which they evolved. For example, assume that during the 
critical evolutionary period (EEA) humans lived in isolated 
clans in which linear families stayed together in their own 
compounds and outbreeding was minimal.48 In this situation, 
kin selection dispositions following location and familiarity 
clues would be quite accurate. On the other hand, this would 
not be the case if in the EEA there were many diverse tribes 
living closely together that freely outbred. Perhaps, in order to 
reduce potential conflicts, neighbors would raise one or more of 
each other’s children in their own compounds, or neighboring 
tribes might exchange child raising responsibilities. Or, family 
clans might frequently splinter with groups moving freely from 
tribe to tribe. In these types of conditions, location and 
familiarity clues would be much less reliable. 
  
 47 See, e.g., DEL THIESSEN, BITTERSWEET DESTINY: THE STORMY EVOLUTION 
OF HUMAN BEHAVIOR 296 (1996) (“nepotism, ethnocentrism, tribalism, social bonding, 
obedience to authority, nationalism, patriotism, territorially [sic], enemy thinking, 
xenophobia, jingoism, and reciprocal social exchange”); E.O. Wilson, Comparative 
Social Theory, in 1 THE TANNER LECTURES ON HUMAN VALUES 49, 68 (Sterling M. 
McMurrin ed., 1980) (“ethnocentricity, xenophobia, territoriality”). 
 48 See Randolph M. Nesse, Natural Selection and the Capacity for Subjective 
Commitment, in EVOLUTION AND THE CAPACITY FOR COMMITMENT 1, 32 (Randolph M. 
Nesse ed., 2001) (“As many have pointed out, we evolved in small kin groups where 
helping others often helps the actor’s genes.”); Yuwa Hedrick-Wong, The Global 
Environmental Crisis and State Behavior: An Evolutionary Perspective, in HANDBOOK 
OF EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 17, at 573, 578 (“[E]arly human groups . . . 
were actually extended families.”). Posner speculates that because the moral sense 
evolved when humans lived in small groups, there was no need to confront moral 
duties towards strangers and hence no evolutionary pressure to develop a capacity for 
moral reasoning. See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND LEGAL 
THEORY 33-35 (1999); Richard A. Posner, The Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory, 
111 HARV. L. REV. 1637, 1661-62 (1998).  
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Dispositions stemming from phenotype matching and 
recognition alleles may be subject to fewer twists than those 
from location and familiarity clues because these kinship clues 
are more direct. Yet even here we can imagine significant 
variations in the likelihood that these indicators would emerge, 
or their strength if they did. For an extreme example, assume 
that a small clan squeezed through an evolutionary bottleneck 
during the EEA.49 Say this clan moved across an ice-age bridge 
to a new island, struggling there as a small group for many 
generations until they ultimately became the sole ancestors of 
all humans. If everyone in this clan looked quite similar, the 
usefulness of phenotype matching and recognition alleles would 
be reduced or, at least, would be more unlikely to evolve 
because of the fine-grained cognitive ability required to be of 
much use in making fit distinctions. Indeed, even if they did 
not look alike, kin identification clues, including ones related to 
location and familiarity, would still be less evolutionarily 
useful because everyone is related and, for lack of outbreeding 
opportunities, complexly and multiply interrelated. Thus, a 
sufficiently useful, though crude, disposition aligning with kin 
selection may simply be, “help everyone.” Here, whatever 
dispositions from kin recognition clues that had previously 
evolved may well dissipate, just as sighted fish species that 
find niches in sunless caves eventually lose their ability to see.50 
Once the population expands in number and location to the 
point where kin relationships become more diverse, the genetic 
advantages to kin recognition would reemerge, but, in the 
meantime, moralists may be happy that the dubious biases of 
territoriality, xenophobia, etc., had atrophied as evolutionarily 
superfluous.  
The EEA of human evolution doubtlessly was much 
more complicated than the extreme circumstances discussed 
above. Since evolution is such a slow process, the physical and 
social environment in which human ancestors evolved surely 
varied over time and place. While there was a common female 
ancestor for humans some 200,000 years ago, Mitochondrial 
  
 49 “[I]f we find a somewhat aberrant population in a species, it is almost 
invariably a far-distant peripheral isolate. This process of speciational evolution has 
also been referred to as ‘bottleneck evolution.’ It may also occur in temporarily highly 
isolated and in relict populations.” ERNST MAYR, WHAT EVOLUTION IS 194 (2001).  
 50 See, e.g., Henry Fountain, The Cavefish’s Lost Sight, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 
2004, at F3.  
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Eve,51 and the period since then is so short as to restrict the 
likely subsequent behavioral variations,52 we do not know very 
well what Eve’s EEA was like, and we cannot discount 
subsequent divergence altogether as evident from the diversity 
of physical traits among modern humans. Prediction of the 
actual range of behavioral dispositions of modern humans 
stemming from kin selection is not a question of evolutionary 
principle alone. Chance, circumstances and environmental 
changes are critical.53 As is the case with all evolutionary 
sources of moral impulses, their actual consequence is an 
empirical question. Yet it seems likely that kin selection would 
lead towards a somewhat narrow focus for moral concerns. 
B. Reciprocal Altruism 
Helping unrelated persons may also be genetically 
advantageous. For example, if a farmer with a bumper crop 
aids an unrelated neighbor whose crop failed, this would work 
to the farmer’s genetic benefit if the neighbor aided her when 
the tables were turned. The assistance may even be indirect, as 
where the aided neighbor pulls a third person from a burning 
structure who, in turn, saves the original farmer’s son from 
drowning.54 This is the reasoning behind the principle of 
reciprocal altruism.55 
  
 51 See DAWKINS, supra note 11, at 44-57 (50,000-250,000 years ago); RICHARD 
DAWKINS, THE ANCESTOR’S TALE 54-55 (2004) (140,000 years ago for Eve, 60,000 years 
ago for “Y-chromosome Adam”); DANIEL C. DENNETT, DARWIN’S DANGEROUS IDEA 96-
100 (1995); Gary Stix, Traces of a Distant Past, SCI. AM., July 2008, at 56, 58 (200,000 
years); Nicholas Wade, DNA Study Yields Clues on First Migration of Early Humans, 
N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 2005, at A8 (200,000 years).  
 52 See GEORGE C. WILLIAMS, NATURAL SELECTION 53-54, 64, 128-42 (1992). 
Occasionally intense selection pressures can affect heritable traits more rapidly. See, 
e.g., JAMES L. GOULD & CAROL G. GOULD, SEXUAL SELECTION 254 (2d ed. 1997) (“500 
generations”); HAUSER, supra note 5, at 349-51.  
 53 See, e.g., LOW, supra note 11, at 31-33 (“Novel Evolutionary Environments: 
Can the Principles Still Hold?”).  
 54 See RICHARD D. ALEXANDER, THE BIOLOGY OF MORAL SYSTEMS 84 (1987) 
(“indirect (socially mediated) nepotism”); BADCOCK, supra note 17, at 105-06; LOW, 
supra note 11, at 152; Dennis L. Krebs, The Evolution of Moral Behaviors, in 
HANDBOOK OF EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 17, at 337, 345-46; Robert L. 
Trivers, The Evolution of Reciprocal Altruism, 46 Q. REV. BIOLOGY 35, 39 (1971) 
[hereinafter Trivers, Reciprocal Altruism].  
 55 “For both chimpanzees and other animals, the theory of reciprocal 
altruism, one pillar of the evolutionary approach to cooperative behavior, is not nearly 
as well supported as the theory of kin selection, the other pillar.” Frans B.M. de Waal, 
The Chimpanzee’s Service Economy: Evidence for Cognition-Based Reciprocal 
Exchange, in TRUST AND RECIPROCITY 128, 130 (Elinor Ostrom & James Walker eds., 
2003) (references omitted). “[O]nly for chimpanzees is there evidence for the entire set 
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Reciprocal altruism has three requisites. First, there 
must be a cost to providing the benefit. In the example above, if 
the farmer’s bumper crop would have spoiled anyway, the 
farmer sacrificed nothing by giving some or all of the excess to 
the neighbor. Second, there must be a delay between the 
provision of the benefit and the advantageous return. If the 
acts occur simultaneously, as where there is a straight trade of 
apples for oranges, there is no need for either party to trust the 
other for later aid. Third, the provided benefit must be 
dependent on the later reciprocation. Otherwise, though the 
initial benefit is altruistic, it does not raise the cooperative, 
trust difficulties of reciprocal altruism.56 
The difficulties facing reciprocal altruism are very 
substantial. Unless the original helper can depend on the 
beneficiary to reciprocate, dispositions toward lending aid will be 
driven out by freeriders or cheaters who benefit without 
responding in kind. Robert Trivers, who wrote the seminal 
  
of features expected if reciprocity is cognition based: partner specificity, selective 
protest, retaliation, turn taking, and the effect of one service on another.” Id. at 140. 
See generally BADCOCK, supra note 45, at 37-47; BUSS, supra note 8, at 253-77; CRONIN, 
supra note 18, at 253-65; TRIVERS, SOCIAL EVOLUTION, supra note 24, at 47-49, 361-94; 
Sarah F. Brosnan & Frans B.M. de Waal, A Proximate Perspective on Reciprocal 
Altruism, 13 HUM. NATURE 129 (2002); Trivers, Reciprocal Altruism, supra note 54. 
Buss identifies the terms cooperation, reciprocation, and social exchange as 
“approximate synonyms for reciprocal altruism.” BUSS, supra note 7, at 254. That the 
evidence for reciprocal altruism among other animals is weak, see GEOFFREY F. 
MILLER, THE MATING MIND 301 (2000) [hereinafter MILLER, THE MATING MIND], 
Brosnan, supra, at 132, and Peter Hammerstein, Why Is Reciprocity So Rare in Social 
Animals? A Protestant Appeal, in GENETIC AND CULTURAL EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 
83 (Peter Hammerstein ed., 2003) (with explanations). But there is much evidence that 
humans are strong reciprocators. See, e.g., Herbert Gintis, Group Selection and Human 
Prosociality, in EVOLUTIONARY ORIGINS OF MORALITY 215, 217 (Leonard D. Katz ed., 
2000); Robert M. Sapolsky, Cheaters and Chumps, 111 NAT. HIST. 20, 22 (June 2002).  
 56 See, e.g., FRANS DE WAAL, GOOD NATURED 24 (1996); HAUSER, supra note 5, 
at 254. One commentator identifies four minimum requirements: 
1. The environment must be one in which there are benefits to be conferred. 
2. Organisms must have repeated interactions with one another. 3. 
Organisms must have sufficient information-processing abilities that they 
are able to distinguish among individuals and remember which ones have 
and have not delivered benefits in the past. 4. Organisms must have 
sufficient information-processing sophistication and behavioral flexibility 
that they can interact with other organisms contingent on the history of 
interaction. 
Kurzban, supra note 13, at 111 (references omitted). These requirements were probably 
met in the EEA. See id. at 115-17. In general, reciprocal altruistic behavior “is linked to 
(1) a preference for altruistic partners; (2) a tendency to form long-lasting partnerships 
with other altruists; (3) differential generosity; (4) normative guidance and monitoring 
of compliance; and (5) moralistic aggression or punishment of defectors.” Alejandro 
Rosas, Multilevel Selection and Human Altruism, 23 BIOLOGY & PHIL. 205, 209 (2008).  
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article on reciprocal altruism,57 identifies two forms of cheating: 
gross cheating, where “the cheater fails to reciprocate at all and 
the altruist suffers the cost of whatever altruism has been 
dispensed without compensating benefits;”58 and subtle cheating, 
which “involves reciprocating but always attempting to give less 
than one was given, or more precisely, to give less that the 
partner would give if the situation were reversed.”59 Reliable 
trust, then, is at the center of this cooperative understanding.60 
As suggested by the prisoner’s dilemma,61 trust requires refined 
cognitive abilities and mechanisms to restrict cheating.62  
  
 57 See Trivers, Reciprocal Altruism, supra note 54, at 35.  
 58 TRIVERS, SOCIAL EVOLUTION, supra note 24, at 387.  
 59 Id. 
 60 “[N]atural selection will rapidly favor a complex psychological system in 
each individual regulating both his own altruistic and cheating tendencies and his 
responses to these tendencies in others.” Trivers, Reciprocal Altruism, supra note 54, at 
48.  
 61 Trivers noticed the relationship between the prisoner’s dilemma and 
reciprocal altruism. See TRIVERS, SOCIAL EVOLUTION, supra note 24, at 390. See 
generally WILLIAM POUNDSTONE, PRISONER’S DILEMMA (1992). For a comparison of the 
prisoner’s dilemma to reciprocal altruism, see Leda Cosmides & John Tooby, Cognitive 
Adaptations for Social Exchange, in THE ADAPTED MIND, supra note 7, at 163, 170-79 
(Jerome H. Barkow et al. eds., 1992).  
 62 See ALEXANDER, supra note 54, at 95 (“Systems of indirect reciprocity as 
expressed in humans require memory, consistency across time, the application of 
precedents, and persistent and widely communicated concepts of right and wrong.”); 
BUSS, supra note 8, at 264 (“Humans must be able to recognize other individuals; 
remember the history of interactions with them; communicate values, desires, and 
needs to others; recognize them in others; and represent the costs and benefits of a 
variety of items of exchange.”); Henk de Vos & Evelien Zeggelink, Reciprocal Altruism 
in Human Social Evolution: The Viability of Reciprocal Altruism with a Preference for 
“Old-Helping-Partners”, 18 EVOLUTION & HUM. BEHAV. 261, 262-63 (1997). See 
generally Cosmides, supra note 61. The cognitive abilities required for reciprocal 
altruism may not be that great. Axelrod opines that even bacteria can meet them. See 
ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 174 (1984).  
  For the biochemistry behind trust, see Paul J. Zak, The Neurobiology of 
Trust, SCI. AM., June 2008, at 88. While “[t]here is abundant evidence that humans are 
adept at recognizing and remembering other humans,” Kurzban, supra note 13, at 116, 
the special ability of humans to remember cheaters is not settled. Some studies have 
found enhanced memory of cheaters. See, e.g., Dan Chiappe, Cheaters Are Looked at 
Longer and Remembered Better than Cooperators in Social Exchange Situations, 2 
EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOL. 108 (2004); Linda Mealey et al., Enhanced Memory for Faces 
Associated with Potential Threat, 17 ETHOLOGY & SOCIOBIOLOGY 119 (1996). Others 
have not. See, e.g., Pat Barclay, Do People Differentially Remember Cheaters?, 17 HUM. 
NATURE 98 (2006); Bettina Mehl & Axel Buchner, No Enhanced Memory for Faces of 
Cheaters, 29 EVOLUTION & HUM. BEHAV. 35 (2008). For evidence that humans can 
“identify people who are emotionally predisposed to cooperate,” see Robert H. Frank, 
Cooperation Through Emotional Commitment, in EVOLUTION AND THE CAPACITY FOR 
COMMITMENT, supra note 48, at 57, 63, or can distinguish altruists from egoists, see 
Julia Pradel et al., Spotting Altruistic Dictator Game Players and Mingling with Them: 
The Elective Assortation of Classmates, 30 EVOLUTION & HUM. BEHAV. 103 (2009).  
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Various mechanisms increase the trust and 
trustworthiness needed to facilitate reciprocal altruism.63 
Among social animals, norms provide one of them.64 There is 
evidence of a genetic disposition to acquire moral norms.65 
Another mechanism is emotion.66 Emotions, arguably, are 
mental states selected to advance evolutionary interests.67 
Among the emotions that affect the likelihood of later 
reciprocation are gratitude, sympathy, love, liking, guilt, and 
shame.68 Even less savory emotions such as anger, spite, 
  
 63 An important mechanism may be “a process of creating conditions that 
make us more likely to elicit cooperative tendencies in one another.” ROBERT H. FRANK, 
WHAT PRICE THE MORAL HIGH GROUND? 13 (2004). Positive impressions of others arise 
from reputation, attractiveness, “the character of your initial exchange,” and being 
alike “in some way—say in dress, speech patterns, or ethnic background.” Id. at 15. 
Some of these positive impressions may have origins in kin selection. See supra notes 
24-25 and accompanying text. 
 64 See, e.g., JON ELSTER, NUTS AND BOLTS FOR THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 113-23 
(1989); ROBERT NOZICK, INVARIANCES 251 (2001); JOHN MAYNARD SMITH, THE THEORY 
OF EVOLUTION 199 (3d ed. 1975); Trivers, Reciprocal Altruism, supra note 54. See 
generally ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS (2000). But, arguably, though 
“community views are an essential consideration and ought to be an influential factor 
in the policy-making and code-drafting process [regarding criminal liability and 
punishment, nevertheless,] . . . such views ought not be taken as determinative.” PAUL 
H. ROBINSON & JOHN M. DARLEY, JUSTICE, LIABILITY, AND BLAME: COMMUNITY VIEWS 
AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 4 (1995). 
 65 After mustering evidence, Hauser concludes: 
We are endowed with a moral acquisition device. Infants are born with the 
building blocks for making sense of the causes and consequences of actions, 
and these early capacities grow and interface with others to generate moral 
judgments. Infants are also equipped with a suite of unconscious, automatic 
emotions that can reinforce the expression of some actions while blocking 
others. Together, these capacities enable children to build moral systems. 
Which system they build depends upon their local culture and how it sets the 
parameters that are part of the moral faculty.  
HAUSER, supra note 5, at 303.  
 66 See, e.g., ELSTER, supra note 64, at 113; Robert H. Frank, Economics, in 
THE SOCIOBIOLOGICAL IMAGINATION, supra note 7, at 91, 96-102.  
 67 See, e.g., VICTOR S. JOHNSTON, WHY WE FEEL 86 (1999); STEVEN PINKER, 
HOW THE MIND WORKS 370 (1997); John Tooby & Leda Cosmides, The Psychological 
Foundations of Culture, in THE ADAPTED MIND, supra note 7, at 19, 99.  
 68 See, e.g., BADCOCK, supra note 17, at 102-05; ANTONIO R. DAMASIO, 
DESCARTES’ ERROR 175-77 (1994); JOHNSTON, supra note 67, at 83-85; PINKER, supra 
note 67, at 404; TRIVERS, SOCIAL EVOLUTION, supra note 24, at 388-89; Robert H. 
Frank, Regulating Sexual Behavior: Richard Posner’s Sex and Reason, in LAW AND 
EVOLUTIONARY BIOLOGY 149, 156 (Lawrence A. Frolik ed., 1999) [hereinafter Frank, 
Regulating Sexual Behavior]; Trivers, Reciprocal Altruism, supra note 54, at 47-54. See 
generally Daniel M.T. Fessler & Kevin J. Haley, The Strategy of Affect: Emotions in 
Human Cooperation, in GENETIC AND CULTURAL EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION, supra 
note 55, at 7.  
  Having moral sentiments that are apparent to others is a signal of 
trustworthiness. See ROBERT H. FRANK, PASSIONS WITHIN REASON 64-65, 96-113 
(1988). Emotions such as guilt and shame may serve as motivation for the cheater to 
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contempt, or moralistic aggression will help by deterring 
cheaters and passive bystanders.69 An innate sense of justice or 
fairness may induce deterrent responses.70 Because at least 
some of these emotions are moral in nature,71 some 
  
behave cooperatively: “There is plenty of empirical evidence that self-directed moral 
emotions have motivational efficacy.” Richard Joyce, Morality, Schmorality, in 
MORALITY AND SELF-INTEREST, supra note 12, at 51, 73 (with references) [hereinafter 
Joyce, Morality, Schmorality]; see, e.g., BADCOCK, supra note 17, at 104; BADCOCK, 
supra note 45, at 40; RICHARD JOYCE, THE EVOLUTION OF MORALITY 111 (2006); 
PINKER, supra note 67, at 404; TRIVERS, SOCIAL EVOLUTION, supra note 24, at 389; 
Trivers, Reciprocal Altruism, supra note 54, at 49-51.  
 69 “[S]pite, or the desire to punish (or at least avoid) those who defect or fail 
to cooperate, is a critical auxiliary system for trust.” Kurzban, supra note 13, at 118. 
“Evidence from a large number of experiments indicates that subjects are willing to 
endure a cost to punish an anonymous other with whom they know they will not 
subsequently interact if that individual is perceived to have violated an implicit social 
contract or norm.” Id. at 119. “Many evolutionary approaches to the establishment of 
cooperation in groups have emphasized the punishing of noncontributing group 
members as a relatively cheap way to induce cooperation.” Id. at 120. See Robert Boyd 
& Peter J. Richerson, The Evolution of Altruistic Punishment, in THE ORIGIN AND 
EVOLUTION OF CULTURES 241 (2005). For the value of various negative emotions to 
promote reciprocal altruism, see, for example, ROBERT AXELROD, THE COMPLEXITY OF 
COOPERATION 55 (1997), BADCOCK, supra note 17, at 39, JOHNSTON, supra note 67, at 
84, PINKER, supra note 67, at 404, Robert Boyd & Peter J. Richerson, Punishment 
Allows the Evolution of Cooperation (or Anything Else) in Sizable Groups, 13 
ETHOLOGY & SOCIOBIOLOGY 171 (1992), Lee A. Dugatkin, Cooperation in Animals: An 
Evolutionary Overview, 17 BIOLOGY & PHIL. 459, 472 (2002), Michael E. Price et al., 
Punitive Sentiment As an Anti-Free Rider Psychological Device, 23 EVOLUTION & HUM. 
BEHAV. 203 (2002), and Trivers, Reciprocal Altruism, supra note 54, at 49.  
 70 See TRIVERS, SOCIAL EVOLUTION, supra note 24, at 388-89. “This sense of 
justice involves two components: individuals share a common standard or sense of 
fairness, and infractions of this standard are associated with strong emotional 
reactions and aggressive impulses.” Id. at 389. See Trivers, Reciprocal Altruism, supra 
note 54, at 49 (“Injustice, unfairness, and lack of reciprocity often motivate human 
aggression and indignation.”). See generally THE SENSE OF JUSTICE: BIOLOGICAL 
FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW (Roger D. Masters & Margaret Gruter eds., 1992).  
 71 “Moral emotions differ from basic emotions, such as fear and happiness, in 
that they are often linked to the interest or welfare either of society as a whole or at 
least of persons other than the agent.” Moll, supra note 4, at 2. “[T]hey typically include 
(but are not restricted to) guilt, pity, embarrassment, shame, pride, awe, contempt, 
indignation, ‘moral’ disgust, and gratitude.” Id. 
Haidt proposes a general scheme in which we classify our emotional reactions 
as moral to the degree that (1) they have “disinterested elicitors”; i.e., they 
are provoked by events touching concerns that reach beyond our narrow self-
interest and (2) they have disinterested “action tendencies” (Haidt calls these 
“prosocial”); i.e., they prime us (motivationally and cognitively) to act in ways 
that benefit others or that uphold or benefit structures that we value, such as 
the “social order.” 
Victoria McGreer, Varieties of Moral Agency: Lessons from Autism (and Psychopathy), 
in 3 MORAL PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 4, at 227, 249 (citing Jonathan Haidt, The Moral 
Emotions, in HANDBOOK OF AFFECTIVE SCIENCES 852 (Richard J. Davidson et al. eds., 
2003)). “Thus, we have other-condemning emotions such as anger, contempt, and 
disgust; self-condemning emotions such as shame, embarrassment, and guilt; other-
praising emotions such as admiration, humility, and respect; and finally self-praising 
emotions such as pride and self-respect.” Id. at 252.  
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commentators speculate that reciprocal altruism is the primary 
source of the human sense of morality.72 But it must be 
stressed, often if judged by the number of naïve critics, that 
any morals or moral-like emotions that emerge from natural 
selection must confront Hume’s is-ought chasm. Just because it 
is the case that these impulses were selected, it does not follow 
that they are morally proper.73 For that matter, they may not 
even be evolutionarily advantageous in today’s world. For 
example, the spite that may have been useful in deterring 
cheating in a face-to-face, closed society in the EEA, seems 
counterproductive when played out as road rage on the Long 
Island Expressway.74 
As with kin selection, cognitive abilities are crucial to 
the effectiveness of reciprocal altruism. For example, as Hauser 
put it, “[t]hese include, most important, the capacity to 
quantify the costs and benefits of an exchange, compute the 
contingencies, inhibit the temptation to defect, and punish 
those who fail to play fair.”75 To emphasize another cognitive 
difficulty, if sympathy or the propensity to feel guilt or shame 
increases the likelihood of reciprocation, then the ability to 
  
 72 See, e.g., ALEXANDER, supra note 54, at 77; Joyce, Morality, Schmorality, 
supra note 68, at 140-41; HOWARD KAHANE, CONTRACT ETHICS 18 (1995); MATT 
RIDLEY, THE ORIGINS OF VIRTUE 151-54 (1996); Michael Ruse & Edward O. Wilson, The 
Evolution of Ethics, in PHILOSOPHY OF BIOLOGY, supra note 36, at 313, 316; Michael 
Shermer, The Pinker Instinct, 9(1) SKEPTIC 88, 92 (2001) (interview of Steven Pinker). 
Recall that others place kin selection as the source of moral feelings. See supra notes 
35-37 and accompanying text.  
 73 See DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 469-70 (L.A. Selby-Bigge 
ed., 1888) (1739 & 1740). “The systems that generate intuitive moral judgments are 
often in conflict with the systems that generate principled reasons for our actions, 
because the landscape of today only dimly resembles our original state.” HAUSER, supra 
note 5, at 418; see also NOZICK, supra note 64, at 237-38 (perhaps moral intuitions are 
irrelevant).  
 74 See Janet R. Richards, The Darwin Wars and the Human Self-Image, in A 
COMPANION TO GENETHICS 271, 280 (Justine Burley & John Harris eds., 2002). “To the 
extent that modern environments differ from ancestral environments, the impact of the 
operation of particular cognitive systems on reproductive success cannot be predicted.” 
Kurzban, supra note 13, at 119. More generally, “moral intuitions often bring about 
nonoptimal or even disastrous consequences in matters of public policy, public health, 
and the tort system.” Jonathan Haidt, The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail: A 
Social Intuitionist Approach to Moral Judgment, 108 PSYCHOL. REV. 814, 815 (2001), 
quoted in Gerd Gigerenzer, Moral Intuition = Fast and Frugal Heuristics?, in 2 MORAL 
PSYCHOLOGY 1, 18 (Walter Sinnott-Armstrong ed., 2008).  
 75 HAUSER, supra note 5, at 254. Hauser advances these cognitive hurdles as 
reasons why so few examples of reciprocal altruism have been found in the animal 
kingdom. See id. at 254-55. For indirect reciprocity, additional cognitive skills are 
required. “Indirect reciprocity involves reputation and status, and results in everyone 
is a social group continually being assessed and reassessed by interactants, past and 
potential, on the basis of their interactions with others.” ALEXANDER, supra note 54, at 
85.  
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identify these qualities in others facilitates the avoidance of 
cheaters. For the person who wants to be helped, whether or 
not she intends to reciprocate, it is beneficial to manifest these 
qualities, sham or otherwise.76 In other words, the reciprocator 
wants to send true signals that she is trustworthy,77 and the 
cheater wants to send similar signals, though they are false.78 
Insofar as persons contemplating aiding others cannot discern 
the signals or distinguish true ones from false ones,79 reciprocal 
altruism will be undermined and even driven out. This may 
lead to a form of a signaling arms race where cheaters become 
more deceptive and cooperators become better at detecting 
deception and producing honest signals of their own 
trustworthiness.80 Among other mechanisms, one way to 
become better at deception is by means of self-deception.81 False 
signals of trustworthiness are less likely to be discernible if the 
cheater herself self-deceptively believes she actually is a “good 
person” who would do the right thing when appropriate.82 
  
 76 See TRIVERS, SOCIAL EVOLUTION, supra note 24, at 389. 
 77 “A signal is any costly action that, if successful, reveals the type of the 
sender. A signal can distinguish a cooperator and a cheater only if the cooperator can 
afford to issue the signal and the cheater cannot.” Eric A. Posner, Symbols, Signals, 
and Social Norms in Politics and the Law, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 765, 768 (1998). “It 
should be emphasized that signals may be ambiguous: gift giving, for example, may 
reflect a person’s generosity or altruism rather than his discount rate.” Id. at 768-69. 
Because character is difficult to observe, Cooter refers to it as “translucent—not opaque 
and not transparent.” Robert Cooter, Models of Morality in Law and Economics: Self-
Control and Self-Improvement for the “Bad Man” of Holmes, 78 B.U. L. REV. 903, 922 
(1998).  
 78 Deceptive abilities have been naturally selected. See, e.g., FRANK, supra 
note 68, at 9-11; Trivers, Reciprocal Altruism, supra note 54, at 50. 
 79 The germinal analysis of cheater detection is by Cosmides and Tooby. See 
Cosmides, supra note 61, at 163. For brief discussion, see, for example, BADCOCK, supra 
note 17, at 106-10; BUSS, supra note 8, at 261-66; CARTWRIGHT, supra note 7, at 198-
202; see also McCabe, supra note 16, at 147.  
 80 See Trivers, Reciprocal Altruism, supra note 54, at 50. Children as young 
as three or four develop some ability to discern trustworthiness. See HAUSER, supra 
note 5, at 280-82; Eric Nagourney, Whom to Believe? Children Find Out Early, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 6, 2008, at F6. Some researchers “have found . . . that the capacity of 
subjects to predict whether others would play cooperatively or not was significantly 
better than chance following a face-to-face group discussion.” Elinor Ostrom, Toward a 
Behavioral Theory Linking Trust, Reciprocity, and Reputation, in TRUST AND 
RECIPROCITY, supra note 13, at 19, 51 (with citations). On the other hand, humans are 
not very good at detecting lies. One may even say we are “pretty pathetic” at this. 
GAZZANIGA, supra note 28, at 103. See generally PAUL EKMAN, TELLING LIES: CLUES TO 
DECEIT IN THE MARKETPLACE, MARRIAGE AND POLITICS (3d ed. 2002). 
 81 “Nothing is easier than self-deceit. For what each man wishes, that he also 
believes to be true.” DEMOSTHENES, THIRD OLYNTHIAC § 19, quoted in Donald C. 
Langevoort, Where Were the Lawyers? A Behavioral Inquiry Into Lawyers’ 
Responsibility for Clients’ Fraud, 46 VAND. L. REV. 75, 95 (1993).  
 82 See PINKER, supra note 67, at 421-23; TRIVERS, SOCIAL EVOLUTION, supra 
note 24, at 415-20. “Extensive research shows that self-deception is indeed both 
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Some signals of personal qualities are difficult to fake. 
For example, an excellent way of demonstrating that one is 
dependable is to actually be dependable when called upon.83 
This costly signaling falls within the handicap theory.84 Just as 
a peacock pays a heavy, unavoidable price for its splendiferous 
tail to prove to peahens that it has strong genes, so would the 
sacrifices to carry out one’s commitments show that one is 
likely to be dependable in the future. One has not only talked 
the talk, but also walked the walk. More generally, showing a 
costly moral trait in one context, as where one volunteers at a 
soup kitchen, reveals a moral quality that may well carry over 
to the context of a cooperative commitment.85 
Freeriding, then, is the major threat to the endurance of 
reciprocal altruism. Cheating detection mechanisms will not 
always be ahead in the arms race. Caution may be called for. As 
  
widespread and highly effective. People tend to interpret their own actions in the most 
favorable possible light, erecting complex belief systems riddled with self-serving 
biases.” FRANK, supra note 68, at 131-33. See generally Randolph M. Nesse & Alan T. 
Lloyd, The Evolution of Psychodynamic Mechanisms, in THE ADAPTED MIND, supra 
note 7, at 601. On the other hand, when it comes to hypocrisy, there is evidence that we 
are not entirely self-deceived. See John Tierney, Deep Down, We Can’t Fool Even 
Ourselves, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 2008, at F6. Frank predicted this. “Once [self-deception] 
becomes sufficiently widespread, it becomes self-defeating. The only stable outcome 
will be one in which at least some people have less than perfect capacity for self-
deception.” FRANK, supra note 68, at 132.  
 83 “Faking good character is an art that requires talent and skill, especially in 
enduring relationships. In some circumstances, acquiring good character is the 
cheapest way to appear to have it.” Cooter, supra note 77, at 922 (footnote omitted).  
 84 If a signal is not costly, then it can be easily faked, and hence would be 
unreliable. See generally AMOTZ ZAHAVI & AVISHAG ZAHAVI, THE HANDICAP PRINCIPLE 
(1997); see also, e.g., PINKER, supra note 67, at 405; Posner, supra note 77, at 769 (“[T]o 
the extent that the signals have the wrong cost structure, cheaters will mimic the 
signals in order to avoid revealing to the receiver that they belong to the low type.”); 
Trivers, Reciprocal Altruism, supra note 54, at 50. 
 85 See, e.g., Paul W. Andrews, The Psychology of Social Chess and the 
Evolution of Attribution Mechanisms: Explaining the Fundamental Attribution Error, 
22 EVOLUTION & HUM. BEHAV. 11, 23 (2001) (discussing altruism as a display of 
cooperative intent useful in choosing social partners). But under what is known as the 
fundamental attribution error, one must be cautious about generalizing behavior from 
one situation to another. See, e.g., Robert L. Woolfolk et al., Identification, Situational 
Constraint, and Social Cognition, in EXPERIMENTAL PHILOSOPHY 61, 61-62 (Joshua 
Knobe & Shaun Nichols eds., 2008); Jon Hanson & David Yosifon, The Situation: An 
Introduction to the Situational Character, Critical Realism, Power Economics, and 
Deep Capture, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 129, 136 (2003) (“Our proclivity is to underestimate 
the role of situational influences, and to overestimate the influence of individual 
dispositions in explaining people’s behavior.”); Rachana Kamtekar, Situationism and 
Virtue Ethics on the Content of Our Character, 144 ETHICS 458, 458 (2004) (“[U]nder 
experimental conditions, people’s behavior is not found to be cross-situationally 
consistent (the likelihood that a person who has behaved helpfully on one occasion will 
behave helpfully on the next is hardly above chance).”); John Sabini & Maury Silver, 
Lack of Character? Situationism Critiqued, 115 ETHICS 535, 540-49 (2005). For further 
limits to any behavioral carryover, see infra note 95 and accompanying text.  
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exemplified by the iterated prisoner’s dilemma,86 a quite 
successful strategy is to rely upon tit-for-tat: I will cooperate the 
first time, and then I will either cooperate or not depending on 
what you did the last time.87 But this will not work where the 
interaction is not iterated, as in the original prisoner’s dilemma 
scenario where the parties are not likely to associate again. 
Deterrence can work in this circumstance. As mentioned above, 
punishing the freerider sends a message to her and to others.88 
But a next step may also be needed. Since punishment is a costly 
public good, that is, it is socially beneficial to third parties, there 
may be freeriding on the punitive enforcement actions of others.89 
This can be addressed by punishing not only the original 
freerider, but also those who decline to punish this freerider.90 
Reputation effects are another means of deterrence. The 
exploited person, fooled once, is less likely to be fooled twice by 
the same person or others. A shady reputation may trigger 
caution by others, just as a good reputation signals 
trustworthiness.91 Some commentators contend that one of the 
  
 86 See generally AXELROD, supra note 69; POUNDSTONE, supra note 61. 
 87 See, e.g., Lee A. Dugatkin, Game Theory and Cooperation, in GAME THEORY 
AND ANIMAL BEHAVIOR 38, 39 (Lee A. Dugatkin & Hudson K. Reeve eds., 1998). For 
recent refinements, see id. at 41-44. See generally AXELROD, supra note 62; AXELROD, 
supra note 69. For tit-for-tat to work well, a person must have the cognitive 
wherewithal to distinguish innocent failures to cooperate from intentional ones. See 
Leda Cosmides & John Tooby, Can a General Deontic Logic Capture the Facts of 
Human Moral Reasoning? How the Mind Interprets Social Exchange Rules and Detects 
Cheaters, in 1 MORAL PSYCHOLOGY 52, 102-03 (Walter Sinnott-Armstrong ed., 2008). 
While the tendency to play tit-for-tat may be selected for, it may not generalize beyond 
the EEA. In discussing the implications of the game-theoretic analysis of evolution, one 
commentator notes that “we should [not] expect organisms to be equipped with 
cognitive machinery that detects when they are in any situation that has the structural 
properties of the prisoner’s dilemma and use a behavioral strategy that corresponds 
with tit-for-tat.” Kurzban, supra note 13, at 110. Instead, what would emerge are the 
“cognitive systems designed to play the behavioral instantiation of a strategy similar to 
tit-for-tat” in the domain of the organism’s social world in which it was selected. Id.  
 88 See supra note 75 and accompanying text.  
 89 See Boyd, supra note 69, at 241 (explaining punishers in terms of group 
selection).  
 90 See AXELROD, supra note 69, at 55; LOW, supra note 11, at 153. Important 
influences on the maintenance of reciprocal altruism are: “(1) strong and widespread 
norms, (2) strong socially imposed costs and benefits, (3) punishment of cheaters 
(including those who do not enforce the norms), and (4) low cost of imposing the 
norms.” LOW, supra note 11, at 154. Yet there may be payoffs for those who punish 
cheaters. In one study, “players who punish cheaters gain trust and respect and are 
thought of as being group focused. The benefits of this increase in good reputation 
(which . . . is a fitness indicator for sexual selection) can offset the costs of being a 
punisher . . . .” GAZZANIGA, supra note 28, at 102. 
 91 See FRANK, supra note 68, at 90-93. 
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functions of gossip is to spread information about the reliability 
of others.92 
Since the ability to discern trustworthiness is limited, a 
range of related behavior may evolve. The classical example in 
evolutionary theory is the hawk-dove game.93 In this game, one 
person, the hawk, tries to take advantage of the cooperative 
tendencies of another, the dove. When two doves interact, they 
divide a surplus from their cooperative behavior, as in a classic 
market transaction. When a dove interacts with a hawk, the 
hawk takes advantage of the dove’s trust and reaps a gain, 
while the dove suffers a loss, as in a case of contract breach or 
embezzlement. Finally, when two hawks interact, both suffer 
losses. Consequently, all else equal, the more doves there are, 
the more it pays to be a hawk, and vice versa, the mix of doves 
and hawks depending on the values in the payoff matrix. Of 
course, there is not likely to be just one type of hawk or dove, 
but rather people would vary in their degree of these traits and 
the situations in which they played one role or another.94 For 
example, a person may be quite trustworthy in a social 
surrounding and nasty in a business one, or belligerent before 
her first cup of coffee in the morning and cooperative 
thereafter, or aggressive when buying a car but casual when 
booking a hotel room.95 This suggests that the payoff matrix in 
such evolutionary games is not unitary or fixed, and may be 
extraordinarily intricate.96 But in a relatively static 
  
 92 See ROBIN DUNBAR, GROOMING, GOSSIP, AND THE EVOLUTION OF LANGUAGE 
171-75 (1996); GAZZANIGA, supra note 28, at 95 (“Gossip may have evolved partly as a 
way to control the slackers.”). “In the natural world, of course, humans (and no doubt 
other social animals) employ a wide range of processes for gathering information about 
the intentions and capacities of others,” including gossip, stereotypes and other 
heuristics, use of a “theory of mind”, and past experience. James Hanley, et al., 
Conflict, Interpersonal Assessment, and the Evolution of Cooperation: Simulation 
Results, in TRUST AND RECIPROCITY, supra note 13, at 170, 176.  
 93 See DAVID P. BARASH, THE SURVIVAL GAME 215-24 (2003); ELLIOTT SOBER, 
PHILOSOPHY OF BIOLOGY 139-43 (2d ed. 2000); KIM STERELNY & PAUL E. GRIFFITHS, 
SEX AND DEATH 236-38 (1999); FERNANDO VEGA-REDONDO, EVOLUTION, GAMES, AND 
ECONOMIC BEHAVIOUR 15-17 (1996); Peter Hammerstein, What Is Evolutionary Game 
Theory?, in GAME THEORY AND ANIMAL BEHAVIOR, supra note 87, at 3. See generally 
JOHN MAYNARD SMITH, EVOLUTION AND THE THEORY OF GAMES (1982). 
 94 See, e.g., BARASH, supra note 93, at 224-32 (“Bullies, Bourgeois, and Other 
Complications”).  
 95 “We are all familiar with modern cases in which the kind of person who in 
many respects behaves very virtuously can become narrow and intolerant in an 
unusual case that seems to call for a different style of behavior.” Joel J. Kupperman, 
Classical and Sour Forms of Virtue, in MORALITY AND SELF-INTEREST, supra note 12, at 
272, 284.  
 96 Cf. KEN BINMORE, GAME THEORY AND THE SOCIAL CONTRACT: JUST 
PLAYING 208 (1998) (“The set of available cooperative equilibria depends on the game 
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environment, the result will tend towards a balance in which 
the costs and benefits of being a dove or a hawk (of various 
types) will equalize. 
While there are other evolutionary games,97 the hawk-
dove game suffices to suggest that moral impulses, or their 
absence, would be advantageous in coping with the conflicting 
interests. For the hawk, having no moral compunctions about 
advantage-taking would reduce the psychic costs of preying on 
doves, and may facilitate deception by avoiding signals of guilt 
or shame. This may be a benefit of psychopathy, a condition in 
which a person is without a conscience and is incapable of 
sympathizing with others, and hence, doesn’t feel their pain.98 
On the other hand, for interactions between two hawks, it may 
be beneficial to have a righteous indignation or other strong 
emotion as a signal to the other hawk that one is not to be trifled 
with. For that matter, these types of emotions would seem 
useful for either a dove or a hawk when they interact with one 
another and even, perhaps, in dove-dove relations, just to keep 
the other dove dovish. Contrariwise, positive emotions, such as 
appreciation and gratitude would also be relevant to these 
games as, among other things, useful signals to other parties. 
Indeed, as the game aspect of interactions is elaborated, we see 
some of the complexities of Trivers’ original theory of reciprocal 
altruism playing out in finely spun webs of interactional costs 
and benefits. The bottom line, again, is that predictions based on 
evolutionary principles of the type and strength of moral 
dispositions subject to natural selection depend on a vast array 
of variables, including changes over time. 
Circumstances, it has already been seen, play an 
important role in the emergence of reciprocal altruism. For 
further example, the person simply passing through the 
community is less likely to be in a position to later reciprocate, 
  
of life. . . . But real games of life must be expected to have vast numbers of equilibria 
among which Nature must choose.”).  
 97 See generally SMITH, supra note 93. 
 98 See Nesse, supra note 48, at 25 (referring to “a theory of sociopathy as a 
frequency-dependent strategy that succeeds when it is rare in comparison to the 
proportion of cooperators who, when prevalent, let down their guard”). “Psychopathy is 
a personality disorder characterized by a profound lack of empathy and guilt or 
remorse, shallow affect, irresponsibility, and poor behavior controls. The psychopath’s 
behavioral repertoire has long led clinicians to suggest that they are ‘without 
conscience’.” Kent A. Kiehl, Without Morals: The Cognitive Neuroscience of Criminal 
Psychopaths, in 3 MORAL PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 4, at 119, 119 (reference omitted). 
That lack of sympathy or empathy is only part of the problem with psychopaths, see 
McGreer, supra note 71, at 227.  
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directly or indirectly, and is less likely to have local 
sympathizers who would feel obligated to act on her behalf. 
Reciprocation for generosity to a person with limited resources, 
modest abilities, reduced prospects from age, illness, etc., and 
fewer family and friends is improbable.99 To the contrary are 
the persons at the other end of this spectrum, including those 
who trade on their reputations, such as civic and religious 
leaders.100 Hence, in these situations, the choice to help another 
would, ideally, turn on a sophisticated calculation 
incorporating many factors and qualities, if the cognitive 
wherewithal is up to the task. 
The cognitive wherewithal needed for the task again 
relates to the EEA in which the impulses emerged. If, for 
example, the EEA occurred when tribes or clans were isolated, 
with little or no interactions with strangers, then the 
disposition to help anyone in need may suffice since there 
would be minimal risk that aided parties would disappear 
before they, or their sympathizers, could reciprocate.101 
Similarly, if social conditions in the EEA were fully egalitarian, 
then there would be little or no advantage to developing the 
dispositional distinctions between the powerful and the weak, 
and perhaps even the talented and the challenged, rich and 
poor, young and old, etc. In sum, then, if the EEA matched the 
extreme one discussed above in which kin selection would be 
adequately served by the impulse to “help everyone,” reciprocal 
altruism would be served by the same universalized impulse. 
Some commentators even contend that the benefits of 
reciprocal altruism are not likely to be sufficient to trigger the 
incipient dispositions unless the advantages are supported or 
reinforced by those from kin selection. That is, reciprocal 
  
 99 “[A]ny asymmetries among the individuals in their ability to affect each 
other will decrease the possibilities for altruistic exchanges.” TRIVERS, SOCIAL 
EVOLUTION, supra note 24, at 362. The aged have less time for direct reciprocation, see 
id. at 388-89, but also less reason not to reciprocate, see Trivers, Reciprocal Altruism, 
supra note 54, at 46.  
 100 See ALEXANDER, supra note 54, at 85; BARKOW, supra note 39, at 54; 
Richard D. Alexander, Biological Considerations in the Analysis of Morality, in 
EVOLUTIONARY ETHICS 163, 179 (Matthew H. Nitecki & Doris V. Nitecki eds., 1993).  
 101 Singer believes that kin selection and reciprocal altruism would tend to 
select out altruistic impulses towards strangers. See PETER SINGER, THE EXPANDING 
CIRCLE 134-40 (1981). That people are altruistic to strangers results, he opines, from 
the capacity to reason. See id.; see also MAYR, supra note 13, at 81-85 (reason and 
culture drive altruism beyond inclusive fitness).  
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altruism will not even get off the ground unless kin selection is 
in place to kick start it.102 
Again, as for kin selection, the EEA in which reciprocal 
altruism evolved is not likely to be uniform or stable. 
Seemingly, the range of cognitive abilities and social structures 
must have changed over time and place, and not in a regular, 
linear fashion. Interweavings (hybridizing) with other human 
groups, EEAs, and other evolutionary forces such as kin 
selection, leave impulses arising from reciprocal altruism to the 
realm of the empirical sciences, not deduction from basic 
theory. The circumstances during the evolution of relevant 
moral impulses are critical, and are largely subject to 
speculation. But still, it would seem that reciprocal altruism 
would generally tend towards particular moral dispositions 
directed beyond kin alone, and at anyone with whom one might 
enter a cooperative relationship. 
C. Sexual Selection 
While the phrase “survival of the fittest” roughly points 
toward one of the struggles facing organisms, the benchmark 
for Darwinian evolution is reproduction, and not simply 
survival. A long life will not, by itself, leave its traces in the 
gene pool. To spread their genes, organisms must not only 
compete with others for survival, but also for mates and 
matings.103 Darwin referred to this latter competition as “sexual 
selection.”104 
  
 102 See BARKOW, supra note 39, at 55-57; JOHNSTON, supra note 67, at 86; 
LIONEL TIGER, THE MANUFACTURE OF EVIL 324 (1987); Krebs, supra note 54, at 337, 
357. If kin selection is not a prerequisite to reciprocal altruism, at least it is a help. See 
LOW, supra note 11, at 154; Sapolsky, supra note 55, at 24. The mutual reinforcement 
of kin selection and reciprocal altruism in ancestral environments may have left 
humans with an impulse for reciprocal altruism greater than is evolutionarily fit in a 
modern environment. See Avner Ben-Ner & Louis Putterman, Values and Institutions 
in Economic Analysis, in ECONOMICS, VALUES, AND ORGANIZATION 3, 32 (Avner Ben-
Ner & Louis Putterman eds., 1998); Charles Crawford, The Theory of Evolution in the 
Study of Human Behavior: An Introduction and Overview, in HANDBOOK OF 
EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 17, at 3, 26.  
 103 Recall that these two terms distinguish intercourse with established 
partners from that with others. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.  
 104 See CHARLES DARWIN, THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES, in THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES; 
THE DESCENT OF MAN part II (Modern Library n.d.) (6th ed. 1872). See generally 
BADCOCK, supra note 17, at 149-88; DAVID P. BARASH, SOCIOBIOLOGY AND BEHAVIOR 
152-72 (1977); DAVID M. BUSS, THE EVOLUTION OF DESIRE (1994); CRONIN, supra note 
18, at 111-249; GOULD, supra note 52 at 3-4; LOW, supra note 11; MILLER, THE MATING 
MIND, supra note 55. Darwin formulated two forms of sexual selection: “intersexual 
selection (often typified by female choice of males) and intrasexual selection (often 
 
2009] THE NATURES OF UNIVERSAL MORALITIES 489 
 
The two sexes in a sexual species, such as mammals, do 
not bring the same resources to the reproductive process. 
Female mammals, for example, provide the more valuable 
resources in the form of nutrient-rich eggs and internal 
gestation of the fertilized eggs. Males need only produce sperm, 
which is not resource costly, and may not be essential after 
fertilization to the success of their offspring. For females, it is 
quite another story. Upon birth, females, through lactation, 
typically supply most or all of the nourishment to newborns 
and youngsters, and do most of the child care-giving.105 Having 
already invested so much in the children, they are particularly 
interested in seeing that the offspring become successful 
breeders. In general, then, the necessary female contribution to 
reproduction is costly and limiting, while the male share is 
quite to the contrary.106 This asymmetry in the essential 
resources supplied by females and males for reproduction 
implies that their breeding interests diverge, which, in turn, 
implies that their behavioral dispositions differ as well.107 
Among other things, when it comes to mating, females are 
disposed to seek quality while males, along with quality, have 
little to lose and much to gain from quantity alone.108 
  
typified by the male-male competition for access to females).” DONALD E. BROWN, 
HUMAN UNIVERSALS 103 (1991).  
 105 See MELVIN KONNER, WHY THE RECKLESS SURVIVE 7 (1990) (“Women have 
done more child care than men in every human society on record.”).  
 106 Which is not to say that males do not expend much energy in producing 
offspring. “[B]ut this effort is more often expended in fighting and displaying than in 
large zygotes and care of the young.” GOULD, supra note 52, at 239.  
 107 The theoretical consequences of these differences were first developed by 
Trivers. See Robert L. Trivers, Parental Investment and Sexual Selection, in SEXUAL 
SELECTION AND THE DESCENT OF MAN 1871-1971 136 (Bernard G. Campbell ed., 1972) 
[hereinafter Trivers, Parental Investment]. For dissenting viewpoints, see ANNE 
FAUSTO-STERLING, MYTHS OF GENDER 179-203 (2d ed. 1992) and SARAH B. HRDY, THE 
WOMAN THAT NEVER EVOLVED 130-38 (1981). See generally CRONIN, supra note 18, at 
113-249; TIMOTHY H. GOLDSMITH, THE BIOLOGICAL ROOTS OF HUMAN NATURE 47-69 
(1991); GOULD, supra note 52, at 249-68; LOW, supra note 11, at 37-44. The differences 
in behavioral dispositions follow from the differences in mating strategies between men 
and women. For evidence in support of differing mating strategies, see, for example, 
BUSS, supra note 104; David M. Buss, Mate Preference Mechanisms: Consequences for 
Partner Choice and Intrasexual Competition, in THE ADAPTED MIND, supra note 7, at 
249; William Irons, Anthropology, in THE SOCIOBIOLOGICAL IMAGINATION 71, 86-89 
(Mary Maxwell ed., 1991) (anthropological evidence of differences). See generally THE 
ADAPTED MIND supra note 7, at part III (“The Psychology of Mating and Sex”). Overall, 
the similarities in dispositions of men and women are greater than the differences. See 
THIESSEN, supra note 47, at 326.  
 108 See, e.g., MILLER, THE MATING MIND, supra note 55, at 86; Trivers, 
Parental Investment, supra note 107, at 74; David M. Buss, The Psychology of Human 
Mate Selection: Exploring the Complexity of the Strategic Repertoire, in HANDBOOK OF 
EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 17, at 405, 412-14, 423-24.  
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Because female mammals provide the more valuable 
resources, women, and their supporters, generally demand 
more from males than a supply of sperm.109 Female preferences 
typically include a significant commitment from males to 
support them and contribute to the raising of their children.110 
Among the qualities of a male that presumably facilitate this 
goal, David Buss includes social status, dependability and 
stability, love and commitment cues, positive interactions with 
children, bravery, and kindness.111 Men, also, before entering 
into a long-term commitment, seek attributes in a mate that 
will be beneficial to them and their offspring.112 Studies have 
shown that the preferences of women and men for a mate are 
quite similar.113 In particular, Geoffrey Miller reports that the 
highest rated personality attribute by both females and males 
is agreeableness.114 This is associated with compassion, 
lovingness, sincerity, trustworthiness, and altruism.115 Miller 
  
 109 Since women must invest more in reproduction than men, they are a 
valuable resource to men who must then compete for women. See, e.g., MILLER, THE 
MATING MIND, supra note 55, at 85-87; Buss, supra note 108, at 410-11. This leads to 
“female choice.” See, e.g., GOULD, supra note 52, at 175-209. But “there has been 
considerable controversy over the existence of selection by female choice.” Id. at 86.  
 110 Contrary to other mammals, “[h]umans are unusual in having evolved a 
mating/parenting system of intensive offspring care by both mothers and fathers, 
which favors social monogamy (at least medium-term pair-bonded relationships with 
expectations of sexual fidelity). This, in turn, can favor mutual mate choice by both 
males and females.” Geoffrey Miller, Kindness, Fidelity, and Other Sexually Selected 
Virtues, in 1 MORAL PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 32, at 209, 218 [hereinafter Miller, 
Sexually Selected Virtues]. For the benefits for a man from a commitment to marriage, 
see BUSS, supra note 8, at 133 (including better mate attraction, paternity certainty, 
and children’s survival and reproductive success). For the benefits to women from long-
term mating, see Buss, supra note 108, at 416-17.  
 111 See BUSS, supra note 8, at 104-30. See generally BUSS, supra note 104, at ch. 
2 (“What Women Want”). For a challenge to some of the main studies by leading 
evolutionary psychologists supporting the mate preferences implied by sexual selection 
theory, see Chris Haufe, Sexual Selection and Mate Choice in Evolutionary Psychology, 23 
BIOLOGY & PHIL. 115 (2008) (questioning Buss, Thornhill and Gangestad, and Miller). 
 112 Relevant to males in a long-term relationship are: “(1) the female’s youth 
and health (reproductive potential); (2) the quality of her genes (judged 
phenotypically); (3) the confidence in future paternity she inspires (her reputation); 
and (4) her ability to produce and control resources for parental investment.” BARKOW, 
supra note 39, at 357. See Buss, supra note 108, at 414-16.  
 113 See, e.g., BUSS, supra note 8, at 134-35; GOULD, supra note 52, at 258; 
MILLER, THE MATING MIND, supra note 55, at 330; Buss, supra note 108, at 419-21. 
Sexual selection “implies that both sexes evolved the complementary adaptations for 
morality: moral virtues that tend to be displayed selectively in high-payoff social and 
sexual contexts, and person-perception mechanisms for judging the moral virtues of 
others.” Miller, Sexually Selected Virtues, supra note 110, at 218.  
 114 See MILLER, THE MATING MIND, supra note 55, at 330. 
 115 See id. Hence, altruism towards strangers is not an evolutionary 
conundrum, see supra note 101 and accompanying text, “[i]t is a sexual ornament,” 
MILLER, THE MATING MIND, supra note 55, at 339. According to Miller, “sexual 
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reports that “research has confirmed that many particular 
moral virtues are sexually attractive and relationship 
stabilizing,” including kindness, sympathy, empathy, niceness, 
sportsmanship, honesty, moral leadership, generosity to 
partner, children, and strangers, sexual fidelity, charitable 
generosity, heroism, and capacity for self-control, self-respect, 
and self-disclosure.116 Many, if not all, of the qualities identified 
by Buss and Miller relate to morals,117 or have moral 
overtones.118 
Most of the cognitive skills necessary to discern the 
moral qualities of a mate would seem to be similar to those 
associated with reciprocal altruism. The main problem, again, 
may be deception. Both women and men may benefit from false 
signals of high moral qualities, such as altruism, 
trustworthiness, and commitment.119 For example, for the 
  
selection may have augmented the capacity for altruism in a runaway escalation.” 
Nesse, supra note 48, at 33 (citing MILLER, THE MATING MIND, supra note 55). 
 116 Miller, Sexually Selected Virtues, supra note 110, at 222. See MILLER, THE 
MATING MIND, supra note 55, at 293. As other sexually attractive traits with “quasi-
moral status”, Miller includes creativity, artistic virtuosity, achieving social status 
through merit, and acquiring wealth through merit. Id. at 229.  
 117 Miller claims sexual selection as the font of most of the human sense of 
morality, see MILLER, THE MATING MIND, supra note 55, at 292-340 (“Virtues of Good 
Breeding”), but not all of it, see id. at 339. So now, we have seen, some argue that kin 
selection is the source of morality, see supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text, others 
that reciprocal altruism is, see supra notes 71-72 and accompanying text, and now 
Miller completes the triangle. See generally RIDLEY, supra note 72. Even Darwin saw 
natural selection as likely to be the source of “a moral sense or conscience” for social 
organisms with sufficient cognitive abilities, though, of course, the three mechanisms 
discussed here had not yet been explicitly identified or developed. CHARLES DARWIN, 
THE DESCENT OF MAN, in THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES; THE DESCENT OF MAN 387, 471-72 
(Modern Library n.d.) (1871).  
 118 For the meaning of “moral emotions”, see Moll et al., supra note 4. 
  “We feel lust for other people’s bodies, but we fall in love with their mental 
and moral traits. . . . The most romantically attractive mental traits—intelligence, 
wisdom, kindness, bravery, honesty, integrity, and fidelity—often have a moral or quasi-
moral status.” Miller, Sexually Selected Virtues, supra note 110, at 209. Moral virtues 
“evolved to advertise one’s individual fitness in hard-to-fake ways that can be understood 
through a combination of sexual selection theory and costly signaling theory.” Id. 
(references omitted). “By contrast, in kin altruism, we may give higher weight to the 
kinship-specific virtues of genetic similarity and expected future reproductive success, 
while caring little about kindness, gentleness, or honesty.” Id. at 214. 
  For a dissenting view of the sexual selection of moral virtues, see 
Catherine Driscoll, Why Moral Virtues Are Probably Not Sexual Adaptations, in 1 
MORAL PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 32, at 245, or, more generally, for an argument that 
there is no innate moral faculty, see, for example, Jesse J. Prinz, Is Morality Innate?, in 
1 MORAL PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 32, at 367, 406 (“Morality is a by-product of other 
capacities”).  
 119 “[S]exual selection is a subset of the process we call signal selection.” 
ZAHAVI, supra note 84, at 91. That altruism is a costly signal, see id. at 225-27. See 
MILLER, THE MATING MIND, supra note 55, at 294 (“Morality is a system of sexually 
selected handicaps—costly indicators that advertise our moral character.”).  
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woman who may not succeed at attracting a highly desirable 
mate, the best option may be to find a less desirable one, 
through, say, deceptive commitments, who will naively support 
her and her offspring, and then do her mating with the better 
catch down the block.120 Sexual selection suggests that many 
men would be disposed to accommodate her mating wishes so 
long as it was understood that they amount to nothing more 
than a discreet, one-night stand. She then would have for her 
children the good genes of their father(s),121 and the reliable 
support of her deceived mate.122 This knowledge by men of 
paternity uncertainty, on the other hand, may affect their 
moral dispositions to help kin, as they may be more certain 
that they are related, for example, to their sister’s offspring 
than to their wife’s.123 As for the inclination of men to deceive 
  
 120 While studies of cuckoldry rates widely vary in their findings and 
estimates, some have uncovered substantial percentages. See, e.g., NANCY L. SEGAL, 
ENTWINED LIVES 39 (1999) (5 to 30%); THIESSEN, supra note 47, at 323 (5 to 40+%); 
Serge Brédart & Robert M. French, Do Babies Resemble Their Fathers More Than 
Their Mothers? A Failure to Replicate Christenfeld and Hill (1995), 20 EVOLUTION & 
HUM. BEHAV. 129, 130 (1999) (6 to 30%); Steven M. Platek et al., Reactions to 
Children’s Faces: Males Are More Affected by Resemblance than Females Are, and so 
Are Their Brains, 25 EVOLUTION & HUM. BEHAV. 394, 395 (2004) (1 to 20%).  
  The proposed benefits for multiple mates for women “include obtaining 
high-quality genes, increasing the genetic diversity of offspring, promoting sperm 
competition, extracting immediate resources, confusing paternity (and hence securing 
benefits from various potential fathers), obtaining protection, and evaluating a mate as 
a long-term partner.” Anne Campbell, The Morning After the Night Before: Affective 
Reactions to One-Night Stands Among Mated and Unmated Women and Men, 19 HUM. 
NATURE 157, 158 (2008). For these and other benefits to women from short-term 
mating, see BARKOW, supra note 39, at 338-39; BUSS, supra note 104, at 90-91; BUSS, 
supra note 8, at 176-82. See TRIVERS, SOCIAL EVOLUTION, supra note 24, at 330-60.  
 121 See CRONIN, supra note 18, at 191-201 (meanings of “good genes”); GOULD, 
supra note 52, at 192-96 (“good genes” hypothesis); Trivers, Parental Investment, supra 
note 107, at 97-100 (meaning of “good genes”). “Women seeking a long-term mate are 
more attracted to niceness, whereas women seeking a short-term mate are more 
attracted to physical appearance.” Miller, Sexually Selected Virtues, supra note 110, at 
223. Physical appearance, that is, attractiveness, is a signal of good genes since, for 
one, it is an indication of disease resistance. See, e.g., THIESSEN, supra note 47, at 126; 
B.C. Jones et al., Facial Symmetry and Judgements of Apparent Health: Support for a 
“Good Genes” Explanation of the Attractiveness-Symmetry Relationship, 22 EVOLUTION 
& HUM. BEHAV. 417 (2001); Paul Wehr et al., Stabilizing and Directional Selection on 
Facial Paedomorphosis, 12 HUM. NATURE 383 (2001).  
 122 That it may not be adaptive for women to agree to one-night stands is 
suggested by evidence that women have a significantly more negative reaction to them 
than do men. See Anne Campbell, supra note 120, at 157. Nevertheless, “[d]espite the 
costs, surveys suggest that 22-25% of men and 11-15% of married women have engaged 
in extramarital sex.” Id. at 160. For other estimations of rates of extramarital sex (i.e., 
cuckoldry), see supra note 120 and accompanying text.  
 123 This uncertainty over paternity affects the willingness of males and their 
relatives to invest in kin. See Gregory D. Webster, et al., Lineage, Sex, and Wealth as 
Moderators of Kin Investment: Evidence from Inheritances, 19 HUM. NATURE 189, 190-
91 (2008).  
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women with false avowals of commitment in order to get them 
into bed, well, is a footnote really necessary?  
The moral impulses stemming from sexual selection 
may be more general than is true of kin selection or reciprocal 
altruism. That is, the moral dispositions would favor a broad 
range of people, perhaps everyone, and not simply those who 
are related or potential reciprocators. To see this, let us 
consider an EEA that is the opposite of the one discussed above 
in which clans were isolated from outsiders. Let us make it a 
miniature of the modern world in which daily activities include 
interactions or path-crossings with a vast array of diverse 
persons, many of whom will never be seen again. Now let us 
assume that a person wishes to demonstrate to a potential 
mate some of the moral, or moral-related, qualities mentioned 
above. Of particular relevance to this scenario would be such 
qualities as dependability, positive interactions with children, 
bravery, kindness, compassion, trustworthiness, and altruism. 
A person who revealed these traits in an interaction with a 
complete stranger passing through could be expected to show 
them even more in a relationship with a mate or offspring.124 In 
other words, a person who demonstrates sincere moral 
qualities when self-interest is at a minimum is likely to be 
moral, even more so, when self-interest is greater,125 as when 
aiding one’s own children. Of course, this is a mere 
generalization. We must worry about deception at work here, 
and about the person who may be altruistic to nonkin, but not 
kin, as in the case of a saintly person neglectful of family 
obligations.126 And we must be concerned that the person 
attentive to strangers may dilute the resources available to 
family.127 But still, the moral impulses that arise in these 
  
 124 But caution is called for by the fundamental attribution error. See supra 
note 85 and accompanying text. 
 125 Similar reasoning would apply to the willingness to trust this person under 
reciprocal altruism. I leave aside the conundrum raised by the definition of moral 
actions as those that are contrary to, or independent of, self-interest. See supra note 12 
and accompanying text.  
 126 This sounds like the stuff of novels. Cf. LOW, supra note 11, at 113 (“The 
fact that a man bears an excellent reputation among men, is no proof that he may not 
be the worst possible companion for a woman.”) (quoting ELLA WHEELER WILCOX, MEN, 
WOMEN, AND EMOTIONS (1893)).  
 127 See Krebs, supra note 54, at 337, 351-52. “[T]he fitness losses to the 
partner incurred by a mate’s extrafamilial caring would virtually always seem to 
outweigh the gains.” Id. at 352. Yet, to the contrary, it would seem that such caring 
could bring status to the whole family that would outweigh losses, as in the case of 
philanthropy by the wealthy, but also for moderate charitable activities by many 
others.  
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circumstances from sexual selection would seem to be more 
inclusive than those from kin selection or reciprocal altruism. 
Let us return to an EEA in which clans are isolated and 
interactions with outsiders are minimal. Even here we might 
find inclusive moral impulses emerging for much the same 
reason as in the case of a cosmopolitan EEA. Since the moral 
traits useful for signaling that a person would make a good 
mate are largely demonstrated irrespective of who is the 
recipient of the moral behavior, there would be reduced sexual 
selection advantage for genes that facilitate discrimination 
between neighbor and stranger, or kin and others. 
Furthermore, this narrow, closed environment also lessens the 
benefits of cognitive distinctions among recipients of moral 
behavior for purposes of kin selection and reciprocal altruism, 
since nearly everyone around is kin or an expected 
reciprocator. Therefore, there would be that much more reason 
to expect widely general moral impulses to emerge in this 
environment. The forces of sexual selection would point to a 
broad generosity, and the forces of kin selection and reciprocal 
altruism are less likely to point in a different direction. In sum, 
morally commendable behavior towards a stranger, whether 
strangers are rare or common, signals a personality that is 
prone to be dependable to kith and kin alike. 
III. CONCLUSION 
The three theories of evolutionary biology that suggest 
the existence of innate moral dispositions—kin selection, 
reciprocal altruism and sexual selection—do not, in principle, 
point towards the same dispositions. Kin selection implies that 
moral impulses would be directed towards kin—the closer the 
kin the stronger the impulse, all else equal. But all else is 
usually not equal, in which case kin selection goes on to predict 
that the strength of moral impulses towards particular kin also 
turns on, among other things, the likelihood that the relative 
would produce descendants or aid other kin to do so. 
Reciprocal altruism widens the scope of the objects of 
moral impulses. It implies that positive moral dispositions 
would be directed towards those with whom one has, or may 
establish, a cooperative relationship involving trust, regardless 
of relation. The greater the probable benefits from the 
cooperation, the greater the moral disposition. But reciprocal 
altruism also predicts that negative moral impulses, such as 
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spite or moralistic aggression, would be directed to those who 
betray trust or fail to punish those who betray it.128 
Sexual selection widens the scope of moral impulses 
even further. It implies that altruistic, moral behavior is a 
sexual ornament, like the peacock’s tail, used to attract mates 
and matings. As such, the objects of the behavior are of less 
importance than the behavior itself, which is to demonstrate 
that the actor has traits that are attractive in a partner and in 
a parent, or, at least, in a sperm donor. 
Thus, as we examine these three evolutionary forces in 
turn, we see an expanding circle of moral concerns, centered on 
close relatives but moving outward to the world at large. Yet 
before we celebrate this movement towards universality, we 
must consider chance and circumstances. These may throw a 
wrench into the works or, to the contrary, facilitate the 
broadest visions of morality. 
All three evolutionary principles turn on cognitive skills. 
To mention some of them, under kin selection, one must be able 
to identify kinship relationships and calculate, consciously or 
otherwise, the benefits of aiding particular relatives. Reciprocal 
altruism turns on the discernment of trustworthiness and, 
again, the calculation of the benefits from a particular 
relationship based on trust. Sexual selection appears to have 
the fewest cognitive demands of the types just identified since 
it is more concerned with the actor’s moral behavior than with 
the recipient of it. But sexual selection puts into focus a 
difficulty for any signaling system, including kin selection and 
reciprocal altruism, that is, the benefits of false signals. One 
can gain from having the traits preferred by a moral interactor, 
but also by deceiving that person into believing so. As a 
consequence, deceptive behavior, conscious or otherwise, may 
benefit. Hence, any mutations that facilitate useful deception 
will be favored by natural selection, as will those that improve 
the apprehension of deception by others. A cognitive arms race 
ensues. 
A product of the cognitive arms race, among other 
things, is a reward for strategic behavior in exploiting the 
deficiencies of other parties and, contrariwise, in preventing 
such exploitation, as seen in the hawk-dove game. Insofar as 
moral impulses, or the lack thereof, are favored by evolutionary 
  
 128 One would expect negative emotions to arise from kin selection as well, as 
a deterrent to those who might interfere with oneself and relatives.  
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games, the likely outcome on the population at large is 
extremely murky. It could range from a saintly altruism to a 
cynical psychopathy, all depending, in principle, on the payoff 
matrices. Adding to this the complexities of superimposing 
different types of evolutionary games, and different payoff 
matrices for each game that turn on circumstances, one is at a 
loss to make anything but the crudest armchair predictions of 
what moralities are likely to emerge. 
Further difficulties for armchair predictors are the 
uncertainties of the circumstances in which human evolution 
took place. The cognitive abilities that would be favored by 
natural selection depend on the setting in which they are 
situated. In an EEA of small, isolated bands of close kin living 
in an abundant environment, identifying kin or cooperators is 
of less importance than would be the case in a cosmopolitan 
society struggling with limited resources. That there may have 
been a variety of EEAs at any one time, or that they may have 
changed over time, is further worry for the armchair predictor. 
Having struggled with circumstances, the predictor 
must also make room for chance. Along with lightning bolts, 
mutation, a prime vehicle of evolution, is a random process. Its 
trajectory cannot be predicted, it can only be studied after the 
fact.129 Moreover, fitness is satisfied by “good enough.” It does 
not require perfection. 
I do not mean to leave the reader with the view that 
evolutionary biology offers nothing to the moralist. It offers a 
great deal. It offers for the moral researcher predictions of the 
kinds of moral impulses that may exist. As some of the critical 
evolutionary factors are further narrowed by study of the 
EEA(s) and other circumstances, and the range of cognitive 
abilities and moral inclinations of humans are further clarified 
by works in the field and in the labs, these armchair 
predictions will continue to aid in identifying fruitful research 
directions. As for the law, which must accommodate and 
channel human behavior, this knowledge will help it achieve 
its purposes, whatever they may be. 
So, in the end, yes, there are, apparently, universal 
moralities, and the law should care. 
  
 129 “Like other organisms, we humans are designed to maximize reproductive 
success, but how we do so may be too complicated to incorporate into a tractable 
model.” Randolph M. Nesse, The Future of Commitment, in EVOLUTION AND THE 
CAPACITY FOR COMMITMENT, supra note 48, at 310, 318. 
